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Reducing Crime and Violence: Experimental Evidence 
from Cognitive Behavioral Therapy in Liberia†
By Christopher Blattman, Julian C. Jamison, and Margaret Sheridan*
We show that a number of noncognitive skills and preferences, including 
patience and identity, are malleable in adults, and that investments in 
them reduce crime and violence. We recruited criminally engaged men 
and randomized one-half to eight weeks of cognitive behavioral therapy 
designed to foster self-regulation, patience, and a noncriminal identity 
and lifestyle. We also randomized $200 grants. Cash alone and therapy 
alone initially reduced crime and violence, but effects dissipated over 
time. When cash followed therapy, crime and violence decreased 
dramatically for at least a year. We hypothesize that cash reinforced 
therapy’s impacts by prolonging learning-by-doing, lifestyle changes, 
and self-investment. (JEL D12, D83, H23, I32, K42, O15, O17)
In many countries, poor young men exhibit high rates of violence, crime, and 
other antisocial behaviors. In addition to their direct costs, crime and instability 
hinder economic growth by reducing investment or diverting productive resources 
to security. In fragile states, such men are also targets for mobilization into election 
intimidation, rioting, and rebellion.1
1 For example, poor urban young men were recently recruited into election violence in Sierra Leone (Christensen 
and Utas 2008) and as mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire (Blattman and Annan 2016). 
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Two of the most common government responses are policing and job creation. Both 
take the person as they are and try to change their incentives or simply incarcerate them 
(Becker 1968; Draca and Machin 2015). This paper investigates an alternative: reha-
bilitation, or changing behavior by shaping people’s underlying skills and preferences.
A large literature has shown that a broad set of so-called noncognitive skills, 
especially self-control, predict long-run economic performance and criminal activ-
ity.2 These skills respond to investment, especially in childhood (Cunha, Heckman, 
and Schennach 2010). They are fostered by family, schools, and communities. There 
is little evidence, however, on the returns to late-stage noncognitive investments, 
and so it is unclear whether by adulthood self-investment or interventions can shape 
noncognitive skills and hence behavior (Heckman and Kautz 2014; Hill et al. 2011). 
It is also unclear what specific skills are both important and malleable.
To investigate, we recruited 999 of the highest-risk men in Liberia’s capital, gen-
erally aged 18 to 35. Most were engaged in part-time theft and drug dealing, and reg-
ularly had violent confrontations with each other, community members, and police.
We experimentally ran two interventions. One was an eight-week program of 
group cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) called the STYL program (Sustainable 
Transformation of Youth in Liberia). We assigned offers by lottery. Following this, 
we held a second lottery for a $200 grant, about three months’ wages. The cash was 
partly a measurement tool, to see if therapy affected economic decisions. The cash 
was also a treatment, in the sense that it could stimulate legal  self-employment, 
and we included it to compare therapy to a rise in the returns to legal work.3 
Experimentally, subjects either received offers of therapy alone, cash, therapy then 
cash, or neither. To deliver both treatments cost about $530 per person.
CBT is a therapeutic approach that can be used to treat a range of harmful beliefs 
and behaviors, including depression, anger, and impulsivity. First, CBT tries to 
make people aware of and challenge harmful, automatic patterns of thinking or 
behavior. Second, it tries to disrupt these patterns of thinking and to foster bet-
ter ones by having people practice new skills and behaviors—learning by doing. 
A Liberian  nonprofit, the Network for Empowerment and Progressive Initiatives 
(NEPI), designed and ran STYL. NEPI facilitators were themselves ex-combatants 
or ex-criminals who graduated from prior NEPI programs.
Among noncognitive skills, NEPI designed STYL to focus on  forward-looking 
behavior and self-control. By self-control, psychologists and criminologists typi-
cally mean one’s short-term abilities to regulate emotions and to be resistant to 
impulse, as well as more sustained abilities to be planful, persevering, and patient. 
This concept has parallels to economic time preferences, and we measure them 
in the manner of both fields. Becoming more self-controlled and forward-looking 
are central components of many programs, from preschool to rehabilitation thera-
py.4 The curriculum focused on helping men foster skills of planning, goal-setting, 
reflection, deliberate decision-making, and controlling emotions and impulses.
2 For example, Nagin and Pogarsky (2004); Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006); Borghans et al. (2008). 
3 Evidence from East Africa suggests that the poor and unemployed are credit-constrained and have high returns 
to cash (Haushofer and Shapiro 2016; Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2014; Blattman et al. 2016). 
4 For example, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) and  Borghans et al. (2008). As an example of an intervention, 
the famous Perry Preschool Program emphasized the ability of young children to plan tasks, to execute their plans, 
and to review their work in social groups (Almlund et al. 2011). 
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The therapy also encouraged nonviolent, noncriminal behavior and lifestyles by 
fostering a change in the men’s social identity. A premise of STYL was that the men 
self-identified as outcasts and did not hold themselves to the standards of mainstream 
society. The therapy tried to persuade the men that they could change who they were 
and how they were perceived. NEPI facilitators modeled this identity change. They 
walked the men through basic steps, such as changing their appearance, engaging 
in normal social interactions, and behaving more cooperatively. They discouraged 
drug use and association with bad peers. Therapy also required men to practice 
going to supermarkets, banks, and other “normal” places.
Research in both psychology and economics supports the idea that social identity 
and associated values influence behavior, and that both can change. This literature 
treats values as direct utility benefits or penalties from acting in accordance with 
or against a set of preferences (Bénabou and Tirole 2004; Almlund et al. 2011). 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler (1998) both argue that 
these preferences or values are tied to a person’s social identity, and that to some 
extent people can change their perceived social category and with it values that 
reward and penalize certain behaviors.
There are striking parallels between STYL and socialization into militaries, street 
culture, gangs, and armed groups. Such groups use similar techniques (appearance 
change, practice, modeling) to shape young men’s social identity and behavior 
(Vigil 2003; Wood 2008; Maruna and Roy 2007). NEPI designed STYL to reverse 
this process.
We surveyed the men beforehand, a few weeks after the interventions, and a 
year later. Most had no fixed address, phone, or even name. Despite this mobility, 
we reinterviewed 92.4 percent. We rely on self-reported data since (like most poor 
and fragile states) there are no administrative data. We did not necessarily trust 
 self-reports, and so we attempted to recheck and validate behaviors such as stealing 
through in-depth interviews with a subsample.
We approached roughly 1,500 high-risk men, and 999 agreed to enter the study. 
Of those assigned to therapy, nearly all attended at least one day, and two-thirds 
completed it. The higher-risk men were the most likely to finish.
Men who received therapy reduced their antisocial behaviors dramatically, 
roughly 0.2 standard deviations compared to the control group. Within a few weeks 
of therapy, for example, we observe large reductions in an index of behaviors, 
including stealing and drug selling. With therapy alone, these effects diminished 
after a year. When therapy was followed by cash, however, the reductions in an 
index of all antisocial behaviors were lasting.
The therapy probably worked through many channels, and we see evidence of 
improvement in two of the hypothesized channels: time preferences and noncriminal 
identity/values, with time preference changes most persistent. There is also some evi-
dence of improvements in positive self-regard, plus temporary changes in drug abuse 
and noncriminal social networks. With therapy alone, a broad index of all these interme-
diary outcomes changes diminished after a year, just as we saw with antisocial behav-
ior itself. When therapy was followed by cash, however, the overall changes in these 
intermediary outcomes were lasting and fairly large: at least 0.25 standard deviations. If 
we account for multiple comparisons, it becomes  difficult to single out any one mech-
anism, but the largest and most statistically significant change is in time preferences.
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How was cash used? Regardless of therapy, little of the grant was spent on drugs 
or “wasteful” things. Most funds were invested in business or saved. Cash led to a 
short-term increase in an index of economic performance (including income, sav-
ings, employment, and investment), due largely to increased petty trading. After a 
year, however, these gains disappeared, partly because most men were robbed regu-
larly, irrespective of treatment.
The fact that the grant was crucial to sustaining therapy’s effects is our most 
unexpected and important finding. As we find no sustained effect of cash on earn-
ings, cash clearly did not raise the opportunity cost of antisocial behavior after a 
year. Thus, economic performance does not explain the sustained effect of therapy 
plus cash on crime and aggression. Drawing on qualitative interviews and psycho-
logical theory, we suggest that the short-term increase in income and legal employ-
ment helped to solidify therapy’s impact on noncognitive skills and preferences. 
Specifically, for a few months after therapy, cash allowed men to project a new self, 
to stave off homelessness and stealing, and practice the self-control and future orien-
tation started by therapy. This hypothesis will be important to test in future research.
An obvious concern is our reliance on self-reported data. We argue that misre-
porting is unlikely to drive our results for two reasons. The first is the pattern of 
treatment effects: 12–13-month impacts from therapy plus cash, but not from cash 
or therapy only. Systematic measurement error would need to be correlated with 
the “both” treatment arm only. This seems feasible but unlikely, especially given 
the magnitudes of the impacts. To check further, we attempted to validate a sub-
set of questions using intensive qualitative observation. The patterns suggest that, 
if anything, the control group underreported sensitive behaviors such as stealing. 
Hence, the treatment effects may actually underestimate therapy’s impacts. We also 
learn that the control group reported fewer expenditures in the survey versus the 
validation exercise, suggesting that some of the short-term economic gains from 
cash may be illusory. These insights come with the caveat that they assume that data 
collected though in depth interviews on a small subset of questions, with a focus on 
trust-building, are more accurate than survey measures. It is better to think of the 
validation as a confidence-building exercise rather than hard proof.
In addition to evaluating the pairing of an economic intervention with CBT, this 
study addresses several gaps in the literature. One is the absence of evidence on behav-
ior change outside the United States, especially in fragile states. Even within the United 
States, however, there is limited evidence on adult behavior change. Most evaluations 
of US-based crime and violence-reduction programs focus on education and employ-
ment interventions.5 Studies of CBT tend to be small-sample and nonexperimental 
(Wilson, Bouffard, and Mackenzie 2005).6 But STYL’s impacts on adult antisocial 
behavior are consistent with evidence from US adolescents and children, which show 
that CBT programs in schools and correctional institutes reduce criminal recidivism.7
5 Two US programs, Job Corps and ChalleNGe, are residential programs for at-risk youth that tackle noncog-
nitive skills but focus on jobs and job training (Schochet, Burghardt, and McConnell 2008; Millenky et al. 2012). 
6 An exception is Little, Robinson, and Burnette (1994), who randomly assigned CBT to 1,381 general offend-
ers in Tennessee. They found that re-arrest fell from 56 percent to 41 percent after five years. Our study adds to this 
large-sample evidence. 
7 For evidence on children and adolescents, see Heckman and Kautz (2014) and Hill et al. (2011). Meta-
analyses of adolescent and adult interventions in correctional institutes find that CBT-informed programs appear to 
outperform alternate therapies (Andrews et al. 1990; Lipsey 2009). 
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Finally, few studies have measured noncognitive skill and preference changes 
directly, and so our study strengthens arguments that they are malleable and con-
tribute to antisocial behavior. If we adjust our p-values conservatively for multiple 
comparisons, it is difficult to single out any one skill or preference change, though 
there is suggestive evidence that time preferences, identity, social networks, and 
mental health all improve. The malleability of social identity is consistent with 
evidence from stigmatized Indian sex workers, where short courses of non-CBT 
psychological therapy increased self-worth, reduced shame, and increased savings 
and  health-seeking behavior (Ghosal et al. 2015). The majority of this evidence, 
however, comes from small, observational, unpublished studies, which, because of 
a reliance on administrative data, seldom measure mechanisms directly.8 But three 
recent randomized control trials among at-risk Chicago adolescents show that CBT 
can help adolescents reduce automatic behaviors (such as violent retaliations to a 
slight) by learning to override fast decision-making with conscious slow reflection 
(Heller et al. 2013, 2015). The parallels between that program and STYL, in both 
the curriculum and impacts, are striking.
It remains to be seen if STYL is replicable, but it is promising that it was adapted 
from foreign therapies and developed its own facilitators from prior graduates, 
enhancing scalability. Future work should test the approach in new contexts, com-
pare CBT to other therapies (or a placebo), and reduce the reliance on self-reported 
data.
I. Intervention and Experiment
Liberia’s capital, Monrovia, is home to one-third of the country’s 4.3 million peo-
ple. There are few formal jobs. Most men aged 18 to 35 have limited employment 
and earn money through a mix of agriculture, casual labor, or petty business. A few 
turn to crime, which is becoming more violent and commonplace.
During the periods 1989–1996 and 1999–2003, two civil wars wracked Liberia. 
They killed 10 percent of the population, displaced a majority, and recruited tens 
of thousands into combat. Since 2003, however, Liberia has been at peace with the 
help of a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force. During our study period, 2009–
2012, the economy was growing 6 percent per year (Republic of Liberia 2012). 
Nonetheless, in 2009, people aged 18 to 35 would have spent up to 15 years of their 
childhood or adolescence in conflict, many robbed of the institutions that normally 
fostered planfulness, emotional stability, and other noncognitive skills.
Marginalized young men were one of the government’s main concerns, especially 
poorly integrated ex-combatants and other men involved in drugs and crime. Drug 
and criminal networks are disorganized, but the government worried they could con-
solidate. They also worried about political violence. High-risk men had joined riots 
and election violence in the past, and they were targets for mercenary recruitment 
into the 2010–2011 war in Côte d’Ivoire.
8 Of 20 studies identified by Wilson, Bouffard, and Mackenzie (2005) only 4 were experimental and 3 of these 
had sample sizes of 100 or less. The observational studies were also small and were of mixed quality. 
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A. Target Population and Recruitment
We set out to recruit 1,000 high-risk men: men actively involved in crime, inter-
personal violence, and drugs, or who were poor and at risk of engaging in these 
activities. With no administrative data on such men, we recruited them directly. We 
selected five neighborhoods in Monrovia known for high rates of crime. These were 
generally mixed-income residential areas with large markets, with populations of 
roughly 100,000 each.
Recruiters were NEPI affiliates who were not involved in the interventions. NEPI 
had extensive knowledge of these neighborhoods and connections to local leaders, 
as well as a strong reputation that target men could verify. Recruiters had worked 
closely with high-risk men before, and were themselves past graduates of a NEPI 
program.
We charged the recruiters with finding men who were homeless, drug-using, dis-
reputable in appearance, or present in locations known for crime, armed recruitment, 
and violence. Community members could easily identify these spots and their den-
izens. Similarly, certain professions had strong reputations for crime.9 Appearance 
was also a useful guide. For instance, recruiters looked for men with a dirty or 
unkempt appearance, long hair, apparent intoxication, or a “tough” style of dress.
To minimize correlated outcomes and spillovers, we avoided recruiting close 
associates. We instructed NEPI to approach just one out of every seven to ten 
 high-risk men whom they visually identified. Recruiters then described the therapy, 
the allocation by lottery, and the baseline survey. They never mentioned cash grants. 
Over several weeks, recruiters identified roughly 10,000 potentially high-risk men 
and approached 1,500. Of these, about one-third refused interest in the therapy and 
survey.10
In the end, 999 men agreed to enter the sample. We estimate that they represented 
0.6 percent of all adult males in the neighborhoods, and about 12 percent of men 
aged 18–35 and in the bottom decile of income (online Appendix A.2). Column 1 of 
Table 1 describes this sample at baseline. On average the men were 25, had nearly 8 
years of schooling, earned about $68 in the past month working 46 hours per week 
(mainly in low skill labor and illicit work), and had $34 informally saved; 38 percent 
were a former member of an armed group.
B. Interventions
Cash.—A nonprofit organization, Global Communities (GC), distributed the 
cash. They ran a lottery, where winners received $200 cash and losers received a 
9 Location was especially important. Within each of the neighborhoods there were pockets of insecurity where 
high-risk men were known to live or congregate: abandoned buildings, garbage dumps, drug-dealing spots, parking 
lots, and homes for rootless young men run by ex-military commanders. Common professions included “car load-
ers” who have reputations for pickpocketing, or wheelbarrow and motorbike parking areas with reputations for drug 
selling and crime. They avoided recruiting men known to be “bosses”—men who run homes or drug dens that cater 
to petty criminals and low-level drug dealers. 
10 We do not have systematic data on refusers, but recruiters reported two main types: men who were poor but 
were low-risk in that they did not appear to be involved in crime and violence; and high-risk men who said they were 
too busy to take part in therapy because they had legal or illegal business to attend to. 
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consolation prize of $10. There was minimal framing.11 GC held cash lotteries a 
week after the end of therapy.
Therapy.—CBT is a short-term approach that tries to reduce self-destructive 
beliefs or behaviors and promote positive ones. It does so in two ways. First, the 
therapist tries to help the patient become more aware of their automatic thoughts: 
inaccurate or negative thinking about themselves or others. Shifting automatic 
thoughts allows them to respond to everyday situations in a more effective way. A 
central principle of CBT, however, is that sustained changes in behavior or symp-
toms also come from actively practicing new behaviors, often starting with simple 
tasks and, through repetition, positive reinforcement, and gradually increasing the 
difficulty or complexity of the tasks, changing both behavior and thinking. This 
practice happens in therapy but also as “homework” (Beck 2011).12
11 See online Appendix B.4 for implementation details. Prior to the lottery, subjects were given about 15 minutes 
of information on how to keep the money safe (e.g., depositing it with a bank) and examples of what they could use 
it for (e.g., starting a small business or home improvement). But GC explicitly emphasized to subjects that the grant 
was unconditional and they were free to do what they wished. 
12 CBT has been studied extensively and validated as a treatment for several of the behaviors targeted by 
STYL: anger, aggression, criminality, and substance abuse (Saini 2009; Pearson et al. 2002; Wilson, Bouffard, and 
Mackenzie 2005; Del Vecchio and O’Leary 2004). 
Table 1—Baseline Summary Statistics and Test of Balance for Select Covariates
Test of randomization balance (N = 999)
Sample
Assigned 
therapy
Assigned 
cash
Assigned 
both F-test
Mean Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline covariate
Age 25.40 −0.16 0.68 0.19 0.59 −0.18 0.68 0.18
Married or partnered 0.16 −0.03 0.65 −0.04 0.67 0.04 0.76 0.93
Number of children <15  
 in household
2.21 −0.58 0.07 −0.51 0.19 0.64 0.29 0.32
Years of schooling 7.72 −0.19 0.68 0.04 0.95 −0.01 0.99 0.55
Has any disabilities 0.08 0.04 0.29 0.00 1.00 −0.04 0.48 0.19
Ex-combatant 0.38 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.08 −0.07 0.11 0.12
Weekly cash earnings (US$) 17.02 −1.89 0.03 −4.85 0.03 5.48 0.00 0.02
Currently sleeping on street 0.24 −0.01 0.80 0.00 0.93 −0.02 0.75 0.26
Savings stock (US$) 33.75 −10.08 0.26 −12.84 0.31 15.69 0.31 0.53
Hours/week, illicit activities 13.55 1.21 0.68 −0.86 0.67 0.06 0.99 0.14
Hrs/week, agriculture 0.36 0.34 0.26 −0.10 0.35 0.13 0.84 0.01
Hrs/week, low-skill wage labor 19.39 0.54 0.88 1.24 0.73 −0.43 0.90 0.94
Hrs/week, in low-skill business 11.53 0.16 0.92 −1.53 0.60 5.76 0.13 0.50
Hrs/week, high-skill work 1.51 −0.05 0.91 0.94 0.03 0.11 0.85 0.01
Sells drugs 0.20 0.01 0.69 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.93 0.92
Uses marijuana daily 0.44 0.08 0.15 0.04 0.13 −0.09 0.22 0.34
Uses hard drugs daily 0.15 −0.04 0.21 0.02 0.52 0.01 0.90 0.37
Committed theft, past 2 weeks 0.53 0.05 0.51 0.01 0.61 −0.02 0.62 0.77
R2 0.16 0.12 0.35
p-value on F-statistic 0.50 0.44 0.50
Notes: We report a selection of covariates here, and all 57 covariates are reported in online Appendix A.1. Column 1 
reports the sample mean. A small number of missing values are imputed at the median. Columns 2–7 report the 
coefficients and p-values from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of each baseline covariate on three indi-
cators, one for assignment to each treatment arm, controlling for block fixed effects. Column 8 reports the p-value 
from a joint test of statistical significance of all three treatment indicators.
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Origins and Aims of STYL.—STYL grew out of the experiences of NEPI’s found-
ers, but over time they integrated standard Western CBT practices, in part through 
interactions with international organizations and experts.
The program combined group therapy with one-on-one counseling. Twenty men 
met in groups three times a week, four hours at a time, led by two NEPI facilita-
tors. On alternate days when groups did not meet, facilitators visited men at home 
or work to provide advising and encouragement. NEPI offered no compensation 
except lunch, since men who sacrificed four hours of work could not afford to eat.
NEPI designed the curriculum and approach to encourage two main kinds of 
change. First, to foster future orientation over present-biased behavior, they taught 
skills of self-control: to manage anger and emotions, reduce impulsivity, become 
more conscientious and persevering, and become more planful and goal-oriented.13 
While impulsivity and conscientiousness are often described as personality traits, 
such traits appear to evolve over the life cycle and are affected by upbringing and 
investment, so we follow Heckman and Kautz (2014) in considering them skills. 
These skills of self-control may or may not be related to economic time preferences. 
The measures and model we outline below treat time preferences and self-control as 
distinct, and whether they covary is an empirical question.14
Second, NEPI tried to persuade men to adopt an anticriminal, antiviolent life-
style, identity, and values, by helping them self-identify as a normal society member 
rather than an outcast. A premise of STYL was that the security and respect associ-
ated with a mainstream identity were familiar and attractive to the men. So were the 
values associated with a mainstream identity; it was no mystery that crime and drugs 
were considered “bad.” But to someone who identified as an outcast, those norms 
and values did not apply to outcasts like them, and a mainstream identity seemed 
out of reach.
NEPI facilitators tried to persuade the men that this identity was attainable, and 
that the men should at least try. Partly through exercising skills of self-control, and 
partly by practice and exposure to new situations, the STYL curriculum walked men 
through the process of change. The facilitators were an integral part of this interven-
tion, because they modeled the change in skills and values. All were graduates of a 
prior STYL-like program run by NEPI, and three-quarters were former street youth 
or combatants.
There are parallels to interventions which show that aspirations—forward- 
looking goals or targets—influence behavior and respond to intervention (Bernard 
et al. 2014). There are also parallels to switching social identity.15
13 Note that psychologists also use self-control to refer to abilities such as executive function (EF) and delay of 
gratification (DoG), both of which are thought to lead to less impulsive decision-making and influence long-term 
success (Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez 1989). Some evidence suggests that EF and DoG are distinct from our 
character skills and are less malleable (Duckworth and Schulze 2011). We measured EF and DoG but they were not 
the focus of the therapy and we did not hypothesize any change. 
14 The limited evidence comparing economic time preferences to psychological measures of self-control sug-
gests correlations are positive but low, suggesting they may be distinct (Becker et al. 2012). 
15 Akerlof and Kranton (2000) review a wide social science literature. Relatedly, criminologists sometimes 
refer to a similar process of knifing off from old social rules and behaviors, and associate these changes with sig-
nificant turning points in life, such as marriage, a move, or a life-threatening experience (Maruna and Roy 2007). 
This literature almost always ties successful knifing off to having a new script for the future. The STYL program 
is effectively that script. 
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STYL Curriculum and Approach.—The sessions employed a variety of tech-
niques, from lectures and group discussions, to various forms of practice, including: 
role-playing in class, homework that requires practicing tasks, exposure to real sit-
uations, and in-class processing of experiences of executing these tasks. Like many 
CBT programs, these tasks began simply and got more difficult over time.16
In the first three weeks, facilitators encouraged men to try to maintain some new, 
simple behaviors. This included getting a haircut and removing facial hair, wearing 
shoes and pants instead of sandals and shorts, improving personal hygiene and the 
cleanliness of their living area, and reducing substance abuse. These simple exer-
cises in goal-setting and self-control also helped men start to operate within main-
stream social norms.
In the middle weeks, facilitators encouraged men to engage with society in 
planned and unaccustomed ways, akin to exposure therapy.17 For instance, home-
work included reintroducing themselves to their family, joining community sports, 
and visiting banks, supermarkets, shops, and so forth. Men also studied successful 
people in their community, and reached out to one as a mentor. Men then processed 
their attempts as a group. Often homework was independent, but facilitators might 
accompany the more troubled men.
Men also learned to manage emotion: practicing nonaggressive responses to 
angry confrontations in class, and recognizing signs of angry reactions and learn-
ing to distract or calm oneself (walking away, doing other activities, or breathing 
techniques).
In the last weeks, facilitators taught planning and goal setting. These lessons 
included training on breaking down large goals into smaller accomplishable 
 subgoals, and then creating plans to accomplish them via concrete steps. For exam-
ple, men would list subgoals of a plan; these were written on a paper in front of 
the room, for all to see; the group critiqued them; and plans were rewritten. For 
homework men would attempt planning in their own lives: how to feed their family 
the next day; starting a garden; making a savings plan; reconciling with estranged 
family; or starting a business. These assignments began easy and got more difficult. 
This process of goal identification and planning is central to most forms of CBT, 
especially for disruptive behavior disorders (Langberg et al. 2013).
Cost.—The cost of delivering both interventions was $530 per head: $189 for 
CBT, $216 for the grant, and $125 for registration and administration.
C. Experimental Design
We used a  2 × 2 factorial design. The experiment proceeded as follows. First, 
following the baseline survey, the respondent was assigned to an offer of therapy 
16 Online Appendix B.3 describes the curriculum in more detail. The full program manual is available at http://
chrisblattman.com/documents/policy/2015.STYL.Program.Manual.pdf. 
17 Therapy for patients with social phobia practices similar engagement (Ponniah and Hollon 2008). Besides 
practice, subjects learn that social feedback is less negative than feared. By reengaging with society, participants 
tested their negative beliefs about themselves. 
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by drawing chips from an opaque bag.18 Therapy began one week later. About one 
to two weeks after therapy ended, GC announced and held a private draw for $200 
grants among the full sample, in blocks of roughly 50 men. Finally, a third organi-
zation (Innovations for Poverty Action) ran endline surveys 2 and 5 weeks, and then 
12 and 13 months, after grants.
The sample were mistrustful of authority, and we randomized by individual draw 
rather than computerized assignment to maximize transparency and staff safety. 
Men in each block took turns drawing colored chips from a fabric bag.19
Balance.—This resulted in 25 percent assignment to cash only, 28 percent to 
therapy only, 25 percent to both, and 22 percent to neither.20 Treatment is largely 
balanced along covariates. Table 1 reports tests of balance for each treatment, for 
selected covariates (see online Appendix A.1 for all, and for endline respondents 
only). Of 57 covariates over 3 treatments, 14 (8.2 percent) have a difference with 
p < 0.05 , and within treatment arms the covariates are not jointly significant. There 
are, however, large though not statistically significant baseline differences between 
the control group and the treatment arm that received both therapy plus cash, many 
in the direction of the both arms having better prerandomization outcomes: a ran-
dom outcome that is in part a result of the smaller sample in these subgroups. To 
reduce concerns that these imbalances cumulate and could influence endline results, 
in online Appendix E.8 we create indexes of baseline data much like the endline 
indexes and look for treatment effects (where these endline behaviors are avail-
able) and look for treatment effects. We find that no baseline effect is significant at 
the 95 percent confidence level, and none of those that are marginally significant 
(  p < 0.10 ) are in the therapy plus cash treatment arm. Therefore, baseline imbal-
ances are unlikely to be driving our results. However, we still control for baseline 
covariates in our main empirical specification.
Compliance.—Both interventions had high compliance, in part due to NEPI’s 
persuasive efforts and street credibility. Of men assigned to the grant, 98 percent 
received it. Of men assigned to therapy, 5 percent attended none, another 5 percent 
dropped out within the first three weeks, and two-thirds attended at least 80 percent 
of all sessions (online Appendix A.4). Those who dropped out early had less school-
ing, less self-control, and were less likely to exhibit antisocial behaviors such as 
substance abuse or stealing (online Appendix A.3). Thus, the highest-risk men seem 
more likely to have attended over poorer, noncriminal men.
18 The baseline survey was conducted in central locations, and these draws were systematized and supervised 
by members of the research team. Only the subject and the research team knew the assigned treatment, however. It 
was not a public draw. 
19 The order of selection was deliberately unsystematic but not randomized. The number of chips in the bag 
generally exceeded the number of draws, partly to avoid a correlation between order of the draw and treatment 
assignment probabilities, and partly to avoid having late-drawing men receive their status by default. See online 
Appendix B.2 for full details. 
20 See online Appendix A.2 for details by phase and neighborhood. The excess therapy assignments is in part 
chance, and is in part driven by two blocks where excess treatment chips were accidentally used. All regressions 
include block fixed effects to account for this. 
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Phased Implementation.—For logistical reasons we recruited, treated, and stud-
ied the men in three phases. A pilot phase recruited 100 men, to ensure that the 
therapy and cash grant caused no harm, to assess statistical power, and to allow us 
to refine experimental protocols. The pilot showed no indication of harm, and so we 
scaled to a further 900 with only minor changes to the interventions and protocols 
in two phases.21
II. Conceptual Framework
The interventions were designed to affect two main outcomes: economic perfor-
mance and antisocial behaviors (including crime and aggression). To structure this 
argument, we start with a model of occupational choice between legal and illegal 
work (such as crime, mercenary work, or election thuggery).22 Later we consider 
how such a model could be used to understand other forms of antisocial behavior. 
We develop the formal model in online Appendix C and outline the structure and 
results here.
CBT could affect these outcomes in many ways but, as outlined in the next sec-
tion, we focused on and prespecified three intermediary outcomes: time preferences, 
self-control, and the values associated with a mainstream social identity. Our simple 
model examines comparative statics in all three. A change in time preferences is the 
simplest to examine in a standard model, and we consider the effects of changes in 
both the discount rate and time inconsistency. More broadly, forms of self-control 
such as improved emotional regulation, planning, and conscientiousness could be 
considered a form of human capital that affects productivity. Hence, we also con-
sider what happens when we model self-control as a parameter individual produc-
tion function. Finally, we introduce a change in criminal identity/values as a change 
in intrinsic preferences over criminal occupations.23
Of course, the therapy is a multifaceted treatment that likely operates through 
a number of other mechanisms (changed peers or family circumstances, mental 
health, prosocial preferences) and affects other outcomes and behaviors that them-
selves are associated with crime (drug abuse or prosocial behavior). We examine 
these empirically below, but focus the model on the mechanisms that are most in 
line with NEPI’s design principles and theories, as well as the psychological theory 
and evidence cited above.
Setup.—Suppose people can allocate their time between leisure  l , legal work  L b 
such as petty business or labor, and illegal occupations  L c such as crime, mercenary 
work, or election thuggery. We refer to these simply as business and crime.
We assume crime uses labor alone and pays a wage  w , which may be uncertain. 
This resembles the returns we observe to illegal work of the type available to our 
21 See online Appendix A.2 for neighborhood details. Online Appendix B includes the power calculations 
behind our experimental design. 
22 It is rooted in models of occupational choice with capital infusions and adapted to illicit behavior, as in 
Blattman and Annan (2016), in the tradition of many economic crime models (Draca and Machin 2015). 
23 Typically, models treat such preferences as fixed, or ignore them. We outline how exogenous changes in non-
cognitive abilities or preferences affect the comparative statics in an otherwise standard model. 
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population in Liberia.24 In the budget function, crime also carries a punishment  f 
with probability  ρ , and we assume this risk increases with the time devoted to crime. 
Punishment could mean prosecution, mob justice, or social sanctions.
Business uses capital, yielding output  F (θ,  L t b ,  K t ) where  θ is individual ability 
and  K t is capital inputs. People start with wealth in the form of a riskless asset,  a 0 , 
and save or borrow at interest rate  r . Self-control skills are one element of  θ , and 
output increases in  θ . For simplicity, we focus on the case where self-control skills 
are inputs into business but not crime. This is the interesting and relevant case, since 
otherwise investments in self-control skills will not affect occupational choice. We 
did not assume this from the outset, recognizing that in principle STYL could teach 
men to be more effective criminals. The pilot phase, however, suggested the oppo-
site was true, so this is the most useful case to discuss.
People choose consumption, labor supply in each sector, and the amount of 
wealth to invest in business (versus the safe asset) in order to maximize their util-
ity subject to the constraint that consumption plus wealth is equal to total income 
from business, crime, and the interest on investment. We allow people to be pres-
ent-biased in the sense that they have a general intertemporal discount factor  δ , but 
can also be time-inconsistent with an extra factor denoted  β < 1 that multiplies 
all future periods relative to the present (the standard form of  quasi-hyperbolic 
time preferences).
Finally, people value consumption and leisure, but we also allow for a consump-
tion value from conforming to one’s identity and values (Akerlof and Kranton 2000; 
Bénabou and Tirole 2004).25 In this case, a person’s identity and associated values 
can penalize criminal acts. We use  σ to indicate a preference against crime, and we 
put it in the utility function,  U (c, l, σ  L c ) , to distinguish these internal preferences 
from external punishments  f .
We are interested in the effect of the interventions on criminal versus legal labor. 
Therapy can potentially influence this occupational choice through noncognitive 
skills  θ , time preferences ( δ or  β ), anticriminal values  σ , or all of the above. Cash, 
meanwhile, can influence occupational choice by increasing the assets available for 
capital inputs into legal business.
Occupational Choice in the Absence of Interventions.—Where financial mar-
kets work well and where people are time consistent  (β = 1) , businesses are 
at their optimal scale—they have borrowed until the marginal return to capital 
is equal to  r . Of course, the poor are typically credit-constrained. In this case 
poor people are forced to invest in capital over time until they reach the same 
optimal scale. The young and those who have experienced bad shocks will be 
the furthest behind. As a result, crime is more likely to be chosen by men with 
low business ability  θ , the poor and credit-constrained, those with low disutil-
ity of crime, and the  time-inconsistent. People may also choose both crime and 
24 Petty crime requires little capital; drug dealers typically work for a “boss” who owns the supply; and those 
who leave town to work in illicit mining work as “mining boys” for capital-owning “miners” on short-term renew-
able contracts that pay a daily wage plus a payment tied to output. This is also why we assume below that  self-control 
skills are less important for success in criminal activities. 
25 We ignore the possibility, proposed by Bénabou and Tirole (2004), that ability is imperfectly known and 
correlated with perceived self-image. 
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 business.  Credit-constrained people with partial capital for business may still spend 
some time in crime. Also, risk averse people may do both activities when returns 
are uncertain.
Impacts of Cash.—If there are no credit constraints, cash windfalls will not affect 
occupational choice. But if people are poor and credit-constrained, windfalls will 
be partly invested in business. People involved in crime will shift to business, espe-
cially those with high business ability. Cash infusions will lead to a smaller increase 
in business for time-inconsistent individuals, however, since they will choose to 
consume more today.
Impacts of Therapy.—Therapy could increase  σ ,  θ ,  β , or  δ . These channels have 
distinguishing predictions. Interventions that increase the disutility from crime, 
σ , will reduce time devoted to it, but will have no effect on returns to business. 
Interventions that increase noncognitive ability  θ will induce more time and invest-
ment in business, and also reduce crime. With the presence of risk in both sectors 
(and assuming risk aversion), interventions in  θ will have relatively greater effects 
in terms of pushing individuals away from crime, because an increase in  θ now also 
makes business relatively less risky. A rise in  σ will also have a bigger effect when 
there is uncertainty, because risk aversion will reinforce the rise in crime aversion 
and further reduce hours in crime.
What if an intervention increases time consistency,  β ? This will increase busi-
ness investment and earnings among the credit-constrained. If people become more 
time-consistent, they will be more strongly influenced by the consequences of their 
actions in terms of punishments, and will therefore reduce criminal labor (and 
increase business labor) as well. Similar comparative statics come from an increase 
in patience.
Cash and Therapy in Combination.—The model implies that both interventions 
should lead to a larger decline than one alone simply because the effects are cumu-
lative. Moreover, when people are credit-constrained and also receive cash, this sim-
ple model predicts that the effects of a change in  σ or  θ will be greater with cash than 
without it. Thus, the interventions may be complementary and the total effect could 
be greater than the sum of the parts. Note that this simple model does not allow cash 
to have direct behavioral effects through practice of new behaviors or reinforcement 
of therapy’s lessons.
Relevance of the Model for Aggression.—This model is most useful for thinking 
about illegal acts that carry material rewards. Other violence does not earn a wage, 
or does not have an opportunity cost of time. Nonetheless, we can cautiously use 
the model to think about acts such as aggression. For instance, we can think of 
some acts as having consumption value that is fleeting (the expressive pleasure of 
anger or revenge) or persistent (deterring future slights). In this case,  σ < 0 . Like 
crime, these acts carry a risk of punishment. If the criminal wage is zero, there is 
still a trade-off between the consumption value today and the risk of punishment 
tomorrow, and the main comparative statics of therapy are similar to the case of 
crime: instilling values against violence (increasing  σ ) will reduce aggression; and 
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increasing time consistency,  β , also reduces aggression. Cash, however, will have 
little deterrent effect on aggression.26
III. Data
We tried to survey each subject five times: (i) at baseline prior to the intervention; 
(ii and iii) at short-run endline surveys 2 and 5 weeks after the grants; and (iv and v) 
at two endline surveys 12 and 13 months after grants.27 We ran pairs of surveys to 
reduce noise in outcomes with potentially low autocorrelation (such as earnings or 
criminal activity). To measure baseline time preferences and abilities (such as exec-
utive function), following each survey the respondents also conducted 45 minutes of 
incentivized games and tests.28
This sample was mobile and difficult to track. Roughly 40 percent changed loca-
tions between surveys, many changing sleeping places every few weeks or nights. 
Just 30 percent had mobile phones. Most went by several aliases, and may have 
been on the run. To minimize attrition, we collected extensive contact information 
(all known addresses, plus at least five close contacts), and went to extreme effort 
to locate each person, wherever they had moved, averaging three to four days of 
searching per respondent per survey.
We collected data on 92.4 percent across all endline surveys. Attrition is rela-
tively unsystematic: treatment arms had similar response rates (within 0.4 percent of 
the control group) while a test of joint significance of all baseline covariates yields 
p = 0.328 .29
We collected longitudinal qualitative data to better understand the context, 
intervention, and mechanisms. First, a Liberian research assistant acted as a 
 participant-observer during the Phase 1 therapy. Second, we interviewed facilita-
tors for their impressions of the intervention and participants. Third, 3 Liberian 
research assistants conducted semiscripted interviews, 14 pretreatment and 130 
posttreatment, with 66 men in the sample.30 Interviews covered job satisfaction, 
investments, economic challenges, plans, antisocial behaviors, and perceptions of 
the interventions.
26 In this simple case, there is no role for self-control skills,  θ , in aggression. This is a drawback of adapting the 
pecuniary crime model, since STYL explicitly teaches men skills to regulate their emotions in charged, automatic 
situations. In some sense, then, STYL may not only change the underlying value of  σ (the extent of one’s desire 
not to engage in criminal activity) but also one’s ability to ensure that expressed actions conform to the underlying 
preferences rather than succumbing to immediate temptation or anger. This is functionally equivalent to predictions 
associated with a larger  σ . 
27 The exception is the 100 men in the pilot, which had a single short-run survey 3 weeks after grants. Actual 
survey times were, on average, 2.2, 5.7, 55.4, and 61.1 weeks after grants. Surveys were 90 minutes long and deliv-
ered verbally by enumerators in Liberian English on handheld computers. 
28 See online Appendix D for measurement details. Average winnings equaled about one-half-day’s wages. 
29 See online Appendix A.3 for tracking techniques, response rates by survey wave and treatment group, and 
correlates of attrition. Of the 298 nonresponses (of 3,896), we (i) had no location information (75 percent); men 
were mentally incapacitated (1 percent), died (8 percent, or 9 men), were in prison (12 percent), or refused (3 per-
cent). Covariates associated with higher attrition include better mental health and income. 
30 Nineteen in control, 16 in therapy, 15 in cash, and 16 in therapy then cash. Sampling was purposeful, based 
on variation in key baseline measures: economic success, crime, drug use, and present bias. 
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A. Key Outcomes and Multiple Comparisons
After observing the pilot results, we decided to focus on five primary outcomes: 
two ultimate outcomes—antisocial behavior and economic performance—and 
three intermediary outcomes: economic time preferences, self-control skills, and 
anticriminal identity/values. The study began before the advent of the social sci-
ence registry, but we outlined these core hypotheses in a 2012 National Science 
Foundation (NSF) proposal 1225697.31 The proposal does not have the level of 
detail or precision as a pre-analysis plan, but it does describe our main hypotheses 
and approach to measurement in some detail. The results we present hew closely to 
the proposal, with only a small number of exceptions.32
Naturally, CBT could influence antisocial behavior through other mechanisms, such 
as drug abuse, changed social networks, or mental health. While plausible, these were 
not the primary focus of the therapy’s design, and as such we did not specify them as 
core hypotheses in the NSF proposal. These secondary intermediary outcomes are 
important and relevant, however, and we measured and report on them for this reason.
To organize and reduce the number of hypothesis tests, we combine related mea-
sures into mean effects summary indexes.33 We do so for the two ultimate outcomes 
of interest plus an index of all intermediary outcomes (primary and secondary). 
We classify intermediary outcomes into six families: time preferences, self-control 
skills, identity/values, mental health, substance abuse, and social networks. The 
first three families were prespecified, while the latter three families (the second-
ary outcomes) were determined ex post, based on perceived conceptual similarity. 
Online Appendix D describes these measurement decisions.
Moreover, the tables present unadjusted standard errors as well as p-values 
adjusted for multiple comparisons. We use the Westfall and Young (1993) free 
 step-down resampling method for the family-wise error rate (FWER), the prob-
ability that at least one of the true null hypotheses will be falsely rejected, using 
randomization inference.34 Rather than simply adjust for comparisons across the 
31 See Blattman, Jamison, and Sheridan (2012), where the core hypotheses (and division into ultimate and 
intermediary outcomes) are outlined in Sections 1 and 4.1, and the operationalization (and measurement) of key 
outcomes in Section 4.4 of the proposal. 
32 These decisions are described in online Appendix D in detail. First, our final measure of antisocial behavior 
(which we called crime and violence in the proposal) does not include political violence, because none occurred 
before endline. Second, after the proposal but before data collection, we excluded executive function from our 
measure of self-control, since we determined it was unlikely to be affected by the therapy. Third, after the analysis, 
we expanded our measure identity and value change to include prosocial behaviors and appearance change, at the 
suggestion of referees. These changes have only a modest effect on the results, as outlined in online Appendix E.1. 
33 We take averages of our outcome measures, coded to point in the same direction, akin to the approach by 
Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007). Note that the outcomes used to create the summary index may themselves be 
composites of many survey questions, such as consumption (a composite of many goods) or an aggressive behavior 
index (a composite of many types of aggressive behavior, a standard way that psychologists measure aggression). 
We do so because it is typically the composite itself rather than its component survey questions that we have theo-
retical interest or priors. In most cases this is reflected in the survey design, where the survey questions in each com-
posite measure comprise a separate survey section. Also, to create an index by averaging the component variables 
would give more weight to outcomes that are typically measured with many different questions (such as aggressive 
behavior) versus one that can be precisely measured with a small number of variables (such as drug selling), which 
we find inappropriate. Nonetheless, online Appendix E.2 shows robustness to an index that averages all survey 
questions rather than composite measures, or uses covariance weighting rather than mean effects. 
34 Other papers taking this approach include Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007); Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel 
(2012); and Anderson (2008). Using the Westfall-Young bootstrap and the Holm-adjusted Bonferroni methods 
yields similar results. 
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major family outcomes, we also adjust for the fact that we are estimating three 
treatment effects (one for each arm). Thus, for our three main family indexes (eco-
nomic behavior, antisocial behavior, and intermediary mechanisms) we report 
p-values adjusted for nine comparisons in total. By reporting both the adjusted and 
unadjusted statistical significance, readers can use the threshold appropriate to their 
question and preferences. If interested in the specific hypothesis of the effect of CBT 
on antisocial behavior, the unadjusted p-value is appropriate. If asking about the 
effects of different treatment combinations on mechanisms, as in our NSF proposal, 
the conservative adjusted p-values are more appropriate.
IV. Empirical Strategy and Estimation
We estimate intent-to-treat (ITT) effect on outcomes,  Y , via the OLS regression
(1)  Y ij =  τ 1 TherapyOnl y i +  τ 2 CashOnl y i +  τ 3 Cash&Therap y i +  X i λ +  γ j +  ε ij ,
where  TherapyOnly ,  CashOnly , and  Cash&Therapy are indicators for random 
assignment to treatment arms: therapy only, cash only, or both therapy and cash. 
We control for a vector of baseline characteristics,  X , and fixed effects for each of 
the  j randomization blocks,  γ j ;  Y ij is the average of the two proximate survey rounds (e.g., the two- and five-week surveys for short-term effects). To reduce sensitivity 
to outliers, we top-code continuous variables at the ninety-ninth percentile. We test 
sensitivity to alternative approaches in online Appendix E.2.
Self-Reported Data.—One threat to identification comes from systematic mea-
surement error in self-reported data, especially measurement error correlated with 
treatment status. In the absence of administrative data such as arrest records, we 
developed a technique to validate select survey variables through intensive obser-
vation. Blattman et al. (2016) reports the approach in detail, and we summarize in 
Section VI and online Appendix F.
Spillovers.—Another threat to identification comes from spillovers. Our recruit-
ing strategies—working in large neighborhoods, recruiting less than 1 percent of 
adult men in those areas, and less than 15 percent of high-risk men we could identify 
on the street—were designed to reduce equilibrium effects such as a change in the 
returns to illicit work. We do not have the data or research design, however, to con-
firm that these equilibrium effects were minimized.
Another potential spillover involves interactions within and between treatment 
arms, especially therapy. For example, because of peer effects and the emphasis on 
social norms, there could be positive spillovers from treating groups of friends. If 
so, the coefficients on therapy would overestimate the effect of therapy in isolation. 
Alternatively, to the extent that control subjects interact with and learn from treat-
ment subjects, they may acquire some of the lessons, leading us to underestimate 
therapy’s impact.
We designed recruitment to minimize such interaction bias, but could not elimi-
nate it. We do not have detailed social network data for the full sample, but we did 
trace social networks within the first two therapy groups. On average, each subject 
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was acquainted with 6 of the 43 others in therapy, and 30 percent reported 1 close 
associate in therapy. Given randomization, we can assume similar relationships in 
the other arms. Without systematic data on networks we cannot estimate spillovers, 
and this is a weakness of our design. The two effects should cancel each other out 
somewhat, but the extent is unknown.
Interpretation and Generalizability—Another point is that our sample is not 
drawn from a well-defined population. This is a function of the setting—there is 
no administrative record of high-risk men in Liberia (or in any low-income or frag-
ile state). We recruited men in a relatively transparent, replicable fashion, but one-
third declined to enter the study for reasons we cannot observe. Thus, the treatment 
effects we estimate cannot be generalized to a defined population. This is not only 
a constraint of the setting, but also the nature of a proof-of-concept trial, where we 
have two promising but highly uncertain treatments—unconditional cash and CBT. 
Thus, our study is akin to a medical efficacy trial, to determine whether the interven-
tion produces the expected result under favorable circumstances.
V. Results
Figure 1 reports ITT estimates using equation (1) on the two ultimate outcomes 
of interest and an index of all intermediary outcomes. Figure 2 reports ITT estimates 
for the six intermediary outcome families. Both panels display regular 95 percent 
confidence intervals as well as p-values unadjusted and adjusted for multiple com-
parisons, as outlined in Section IIIA. Figure 1 adjusts for 9 comparisons (3 arms 
 × 3 outcomes) and Figure 2 adjusts for 18.35
Broadly speaking, cash did not lead to a statistically significant or sustained 
reduction in overall antisocial behaviors, but therapy did. In the short run, ther-
apy led to large reductions, by 0.25 standard deviations with therapy alone and 
0.31 standard deviations with therapy plus cash. This reduction in antisocial behav-
iors persisted, however, only when therapy was followed by cash: one year after 
therapy, therapy alone led to a 0.08 standard deviation fall in antisocial behaviors 
(not statistically significant) compared to a 0.25 standard deviation fall with therapy 
plus cash (significant at the 1 percent with unadjusted p-values, and at the 5 per-
cent level if adjusted). This difference between therapy and therapy plus cash after 
12– 13 months is significant at the 5 percent level using unadjusted p-values.36
35 These are calculated separately for the 2–5 week and 12–13 month surveys. Online Appendix E.1 also dis-
plays results if we ignore the ultimate/intermediary and primary/secondary distinctions, and simply adjust p-values 
for  3 × 8 = 24 comparisons. In this case, the short-term conclusions are unaffected, but over 12–13 months, the 
effect of cash plus therapy on antisocial behaviors has a p-value of 0.106. As seen in online Appendix E.2, these 
effects are robust to a variety of specifications and attrition scenarios. We obtain similar results if we: pool the end-
lines rather than averaging them; construct summary indexes of all underlying survey questions rather than indexes 
of the composite measures; or covariance weight rather than weight index components equally. We also show that 
the results are robust to conservative attrition scenarios by substituting extreme values for missing outcomes. 
36 See online Appendix E.3 for formal tests of the difference between both therapy and cash to therapy or cash 
alone. Online Appendix E.4 tests whether 2–5-week and 12–13-month impacts are equal. We cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the effects of both therapy and cash are equal over time, but we can reject the equality of effects for 
therapy alone. 
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Figure 1. Program Impacts on the Two Ultimate Outcomes and an Index of All Intermediary Outcomes 
(z-scores) with 95 Percent Confidence Intervals and Unadjusted/Adjusted p-values
Notes: The figure reports the effect of each treatment arm after 2–5 weeks and 12–13 months with 95 percent con-
fidence intervals and two p-values, one unadjusted and one adjusted for 9 comparisons (3 arms and 3 outcomes) 
using the Westfall-Young method. Treatment effects are estimated via OLS controlling for baseline covariates and 
block fixed effects. Each summary index is the standardized mean of composite outcomes. Standard errors are 
heteroskedastic-robust.
Figure 2. Program Impacts on Families of Intermediary Outcomes (z-scores) with 95 Percent  
Confidence Intervals and Unadjusted/Adjusted p-values
Note: Estimated as in Figure 1, except that adjusted p-values account for 18 comparisons (3 arms and 6 outcomes).
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p < 0.001 / <0.001
p < 0.001 / 0.004
p = 0.211 / 0.904
p = 0.006 / 0.067
p = 0.011 / 0.154
p = 0.696 / 0.833
p = 0.047 / 0.464
p = 0.001 / 0.019
p = 0.006 / 0.067
p = 0.024 / 0.287
p = 0.335 / 0.952
p = 0.145 / 0.826
p < 0.001 / 0.006
p = 0.222 / 0.681
p = 0.043 / 0.319
p = 0.383 / 0.833
2–5 weeks 12–13 weeks
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We see a change of similar proportions of the intermediary outcomes in aggre-
gate, and this too is only persistent in the group that received therapy plus cash.37 
Individually, most of the intermediary outcomes shift in the expected direction, 
and moderate over time. In the short run, only time preferences, mental health, and 
social networks are statistically significant using the more conservative adjusted 
p-values. After a year, no individual intermediary outcome is significant using the 
adjusted p-values, although all (except substance abuse) are pointing in the expected 
direction.
A. Antisocial Behaviors
We defined antisocial behaviors as disruptive or harmful acts toward others, such 
as crime or aggression. Thus, the family excludes self-harm (e.g., drug abuse) or 
acts by peers. Table 2 reports impacts on the components of the antisocial behav-
ior index, for illustrative purposes. The table reports both unadjusted and adjusted 
p-values. The adjusted p-values on the antisocial behaviors family index come 
directly from Figure 1 (adjusted for the nine comparisons of three arms and three 
outcomes). The adjusted p-values on the seven components reflects the  3 × 7 = 21 
comparisons across all arms and components.
We constructed the seven component measures from sets of related survey ques-
tions, each typically from its own survey module. All are self-reported. In general, 
the coefficients on therapy only or therapy plus cash are negative, and a majority are 
statistically significant using unadjusted standard errors. We must interpret the indi-
vidual point estimates with caution, since almost none of the individual components 
are significant when we adjust for 24 comparisons, save aggressive behaviors.
•	 Drug	selling	and	other	crime. In the short run, 17 percent of the control group 
said they sold drugs, and they admitted to 2.6 acts of theft in the past two 
weeks. A year later, 13.5 percent sold drugs and they reported 1.9 acts of theft. 
Crime rates may fall because we are recruiting people in hard times, and there 
is regression to the mean. With therapy, however, crime rates fell by almost 
50 percent in the short run, and this fall persisted a year with therapy plus cash. 
Online Appendix D describes specific crime measures. To give a crude sense of 
magnitude, if we extrapolate results to the full year since baseline, therapy plus 
cash led men to go from 66 to 40 crimes per person per year (online Appendix 
E.6). Given the $530 intervention cost, this is roughly $21 per crime in the first 
year, ignoring any ongoing impact on crime or other program benefits.
•	 Fights. We also asked about nine types of verbal and physical altercations in 
the past two weeks, including the frequency and severity of disputes with peers, 
neighbors, leaders, or police. Here, as with all summary indexes in the paper, 
37 A natural question is whether the therapy is impactful for the most or least antisocial men. Online Appendix E.7 
reports ITT regressions where we add an interaction between treatment arms and a standardized index for baseline 
antisocial behavior, as well as initial future orientation and self-control. The therapy was impactful for the average 
participant, but the greatest decline in antisocial behavior was among those with the highest antisocial behaviors and 
the lowest levels of self-control and future orientation. These estimates must be taken with caution, since the het-
erogeneity analysis was not prespecified. But these were the only heterogeneity analyses run on antisocial behavior. 
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we use the standardized mean effects of all nine survey questions.38 On aver-
age, men reported about one dispute in the past two weeks. None of the effects 
are distinguishable from zero, and only the point estimates on therapy and cash 
are negative.
38 A main reason is because the measurement scales differ across component survey variables and the abso-
lute valuer of the scales themselves are not meaningful (e.g., a frequency scale of 0–3, from never to often). We 
standardize individual survey questions, average them, and standardize this composite to have mean zero and unit 
standard deviation. Results are robust to alternate weighting and indexing approaches. 
Table 2—Program Impacts on Antisocial Behaviors
ITT regression: (N = 947)
Therapy only Cash only Both
Control
p-value p-value p-value
mean ITT SE Unadj. Adj. ITT SE Unadj. Adj. ITT SE Unadj. Adj.
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Panel A. 2–5 week impacts
Antisocial behaviors,  
 z-score
0.151 −0.249 [0.088] 0.005 0.026 −0.079 [0.091] 0.385 0.391 −0.308 [0.089] 0.001 0.004
 Usually sells drugs 0.166 −0.077 [0.027] 0.005 0.082 −0.041 [0.029] 0.157 0.803 −0.076 [0.028] 0.006 0.099
 # of thefts/robberies  
  in past 2 weeks
2.577 −0.841 [0.400] 0.036 0.359 −0.770 [0.409] 0.060 0.502 −1.236 [0.407] 0.002 0.045
 Disputes and fights in  
  past 2 weeks, z-score
0.076 0.013 [0.092] 0.888 0.999 0.027 [0.091] 0.768 0.999 −0.132 [0.076] 0.084 0.596
 Carries a weapon on  
  bodya
0.157 −0.086 [0.034] 0.013 0.167 −0.045 [0.037] 0.224 0.888 −0.093 [0.035] 0.007 0.115
 Arrested in past  
  2 weeks
0.139 −0.011 [0.027] 0.674 0.999 0.006 [0.027] 0.819 0.999 −0.013 [0.029] 0.637 0.999
 Aggressive behaviors,  
  z-score
0.102 −0.208 [0.081] 0.011 0.151 0.008 [0.085] 0.928 0.999 −0.196 [0.087] 0.024 0.275
 Verbal/physical abuse  
  of partner, z-scorea
−0.035 −0.087 [0.111] 0.430 0.985 0.091 [0.114] 0.422 0.985 −0.032 [0.115] 0.777 0.999
Panel B. 12–13 month impacts
Antisocial behaviors,  
 z-score
0.032 −0.083 [0.093] 0.373 0.878 0.132 [0.097] 0.175 0.681 −0.247 [0.088] 0.005 0.037
 Usually sells drugs 0.135 −0.034 [0.029] 0.249 0.909 0.035 [0.030] 0.244 0.909 −0.059 [0.029] 0.041 0.474
 # of thefts/robberies  
  in past 2 weeks
1.839 0.073 [0.395] 0.855 0.997 0.352 [0.388] 0.365 0.943 −0.728 [0.363] 0.045 0.482
 Disputes and fights in  
  past 2 weeks, z-score
−0.060 −0.026 [0.091] 0.772 0.997 0.100 [0.090] 0.267 0.909 −0.100 [0.077] 0.194 0.881
 Carries a weapon on  
  bodya
0.148 −0.059 [0.031] 0.061 0.553 0.043 [0.035] 0.215 0.894 −0.066 [0.033] 0.049 0.490
 Arrested in past  
  2 weeks
0.118 −0.006 [0.024] 0.811 0.997 0.007 [0.025] 0.793 0.997 −0.033 [0.024] 0.171 0.863
 Aggressive behaviors,  
  z-score
0.188 −0.153 [0.110] 0.163 0.863 −0.043 [0.107] 0.685 0.997 −0.339 [0.109] 0.002 0.035
 Verbal/physical abuse  
  of partner, z-scorea
−0.071 0.142 [0.100] 0.156 0.863 0.233 [0.113] 0.040 0.474 0.059 [0.104] 0.574 0.992
Notes: The table reports intent-to-treat estimates of the effect of each treatment arm after 2–5 weeks and 
12–13 months, controlling for baseline covariates and block fixed effects. We focus on predefined composite mea-
sures, typically defined by survey module. For instance, thefts/robberies is the sum of 8 kinds of crimes; disputes/
fights is the standardized mean of 9 kinds of physical or verbal altercations with peers, community, and authori-
ties; aggressive behaviors is the standardized mean of 19 possible types of aggression and hostility; and verbal and 
physical abuse of partners is the standardized mean of 3 forms of verbal abuse of intimate partners plus one form 
of physical abuse. (For the latter two cases, we report standardized indexes since the incidents are measured on a 
0–3 frequency scale, and the absolute sum itself has no interpretation.) The overall summary index is the standard-
ized mean of these seven composite outcomes, standardized. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported 
in brackets. Adjusted p-values use the Westfall-Young method to correct for multiple comparisons, as described in 
Section IIIA. The overall family index is adjusted for nine comparisons, as in Figure 1. Within each endline round, 
the component indexes are adjusted for 21 comparisons, for 3 arms and 7 outcomes. p-values less than 0.05 are 
bolded.
a These variables were not collected during every phase/round, so their regressions have a smaller sample size.
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•	 Weapons. We asked men if they carried a weapon on their body for protection. 
This was typically a knife, as guns were rare. After a year, 15 percent were car-
rying a weapon, and this fell about by about one-half with either therapy alone 
or therapy plus cash.
•	 Arrests.	Fourteen percent of the control group reported an arrest in the two 
weeks before the short-run endline, and 12 percent after a year. We did not see 
a statistically significant decline in arrests, though after one year the coeffi-
cient on therapy plus cash represented decline of almost one-third, or about one 
arrest per year.
•	 Aggressive	and	hostile	behaviors. We asked 19 questions about reactive and 
proactive aggression, such as the frequency with which they yell, curse, bully 
others, cheat, or lose their tempers.39 After a year, the index of all 19 questions 
fell 0.15 standard deviations (not significant) with therapy alone and 0.34 with 
both (significant at the 5 percent level with multiple comparison adjustment).
•	 Intimate	partner	abuse. We have a crude measure of intimate partner abuse—
three questions on verbal abuse (e.g., cursing and yelling) and one on physical 
abuse in the past two weeks. A standardized index of these measures fell little in 
the short run with therapy, and after a year the coefficient are actually positive 
(the only instance where therapy is positively correlated with violence).
•	 Political	violence. Given Monrovia’s history of mercenary recruitment, riots, 
and election violence, we predicted the men would have opportunities for polit-
ical violence. Indeed, shortly after the Phase 1 men received therapy, there was 
a minor riot in the city.40 From then, however, Liberia entered one of the most 
politically quiescent periods in recent history, and so we had no political vio-
lence to measure. This is the only prespecified outcome that we could not test 
directly.
B. Economic Performance
Table 3 reports program impacts on an index of measures of economic perfor-
mance: income, homelessness, savings, investment, and employment levels. In the 
month after grants, general economic activity increased among those receiving cash 
alone (0.66 standard deviations) or cash following therapy (0.58 standard devia-
tions). But after a year the effects in all three arms have approached zero. The same 
patterns hold if we look at income alone.41 We measured income in three ways: 
(i) consumption in the past two weeks; (ii) estimated earnings in all activities in 
the past two weeks; and (iii) an index of durable assets.42 The short-term rise in 
39 We used nine questions from a standard scale, adapted to Liberian English (Raine et al. 2006), and added ten 
more locally relevant acts based on our qualitative interviews. 
40 The men in all three treatment arms were slightly less likely to participate or sympathize with the rioters, but 
with a sample size of just 100 these effects were not significant. 
41 We focus on an overall index of economic performance to reduce concerns of cherry-picking, and because the 
NSF proposal we use as a pre-analysis plan did not single out income as our primary metric. 
42 To obtain earnings, we first asked each respondent their gross and net earnings in the past four weeks across 
25 economic activities (legal and illegal). This earnings measure could still be subject to recall and other biases, and 
may inadequately capture home production. Thus, we also use two measure of permanent income. One is an index 
of durable assets—a z-score constructed by taking the first principal component of 42 measures of land, housing 
quality, and small and large household assets. We also conduct an abbreviated consumption module of short-term 
food and nonfood consumption. 
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 consumption is significant at the 1 percent level, and the rise in assets at the 10 per-
cent level, after adjusting for multiple comparisons. An overall index of all three 
income measures is significant at the 1 percent level (not shown). Homelessness 
also falls significantly as income rises, but there is no decline after a year.
Consumption and assets could rise simply from spending the grant. But this does 
not explain the temporary earnings boost. Overall, the cash seems to have been 
invested in petty business, and this accounts for the rise in short-run earnings. But 
bad shocks, especially theft, meant these gains were fleeting.
To see this, we assessed grant spending in two ways. Using pictures of different 
types of spending and plastic chips, we first asked grant recipients to indicate how 
they used the grant. Table 4 reports self-reported allocations of the grant by treat-
ment arm. We see little effect of the recent therapy on allocations. Little of the grant 
seems to have been spent on drugs, alcohol, gambling, and prostitution. Even if men 
underreport these expenses, we see no difference between cash recipients who did 
and did not receive therapy.
We can also look at expenditure data, which included a range of business invest-
ments in the two weeks prior to the two- and five-week surveys. As reported in 
Table 3, those who received only cash reported $56 more investment in each two-
week period. Thus, the total 5-week investment treatment effect is at least $112—just 
Table 3—Program Impacts on Economic Performance
ITT regression: (N = 947)
Therapy only Cash only Both
Control
p-values p-values p-values
mean ITT SE Unadj. Adj. ITT SE Unadj. Adj. ITT SE Unadj. Adj.
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Panel A. 2–5 week impacts
Economic 
 performance, 
 z-score 
−0.312 0.155 [0.086] 0.073 0.199 0.658 [0.096] <0.001 <0.001 0.580 [0.096] <0.001 <0.001
 Consumption,
  past two 
  weeks, US$
44.394 10.683 [3.812] 0.005 0.066 24.040 [4.199] <0.001 <0.001 20.695 [3.553] <0.001 <0.001
 Weekly 
  earnings 
  in past two 
  weeks, US$
14.410 1.351 [1.592] 0.396 0.907 4.128 [1.572] 0.009 0.106 3.036 [1.535] 0.048 0.383
 Durable 
  consumption 
  assets, 
  z-score
−0.093 0.124 [0.094] 0.185 0.738 0.138 [0.094] 0.141 0.672 0.240 [0.097] 0.014 0.141
 Savings stock 
  (US$)a 45.957 −1.652 [8.901] 0.853 0.981 16.342 [10.018] 0.103 0.591 18.131 [10.169] 0.075 0.503
 Investment 
  in past two 
  weeks (US$)
18.444 6.748 [6.291] 0.284 0.849 55.750 [8.410] <0.001 <0.001 48.122 [7.797] <0.001 <0.001
 Hours/week 
  of work in 
  past month
36.773 1.044 [2.879] 0.717 0.978 7.439 [2.907] 0.011 0.119 1.787 [2.966] 0.547 0.953
 Homeless 
  in past two 
  weeks
0.202 0.004 [0.029] 0.882 0.981 −0.090 [0.029] 0.002 0.032 −0.100 [0.029] 0.001 0.010
 Home robbed 
  or belongings 
  stolen in past 
  month
0.859 −0.011 [0.035] 0.759 −0.009 [0.036] 0.808 −0.012 [0.038] 0.752
(Continued )
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ITT regression: (N = 947)
Therapy only Cash only Both
Control
p-values p-values p-values
mean ITT SE Unadj. Adj. ITT SE Unadj. Adj. ITT SE Unadj. Adj.
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Panel B. 12–13 month impacts
Economic 
 performance, 
 z-score
−0.031 0.065 [0.104] 0.533 0.904 0.002 [0.101] 0.984 1.000 0.069 [0.098] 0.478 0.904
 Consumption, 
  past two
  weeks, US$
47.347 −1.870 [3.808] 0.623 0.999 −2.615 [3.605] 0.468 0.998 −5.005 [3.589] 0.164 0.934
 Weekly 
  earnings 
  in past two 
  weeks, US$
17.595 0.764 [1.723] 0.658 0.999 1.341 [1.663] 0.420 0.998 0.436 [1.882] 0.817 0.999
 Durable 
  consumption 
  assets, 
  z-scorea
0.009 0.143 [0.096] 0.138 0.904 −0.111 [0.097] 0.251 0.983 0.086 [0.096] 0.369 0.996
 Savings stock 
  (US$)a 51.395 11.360 [11.042] 0.304 0.991 2.026 [10.245] 0.843 0.999 21.744 [11.352] 0.056 0.616
 Value of 
  business 
  assets 
  (US$)a
26.121 3.116 [13.431] 0.817 0.999 19.391 [15.276] 0.205 0.964 13.548 [13.007] 0.298 0.991
 Hours/week 
  of work in 
  past month
34.273 1.030 [2.550] 0.686 0.999 0.681 [2.525] 0.788 0.999 −1.416 [2.493] 0.570 0.999
 Homeless 
  in past two 
  weeks
0.145 0.018 [0.030] 0.554 0.999 0.016 [0.029] 0.586 0.999 −0.020 [0.030] 0.497 0.999
 Home robbed 
  or belongings 
  stolen in past 
  month
0.797 −0.037 [0.043] 0.386 −0.086 [0.042] 0.039 0.013 [0.042] 0.766
Notes: The table reports intent to treat estimates of the effect of each treatment arm controlling for baseline covariates 
and block fixed effects. The income summary index is the standardized mean of three composite outcomes (themselves 
first standardized). Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Adjusted p-values use the Westfall-
Young method to correct for multiple comparisons, as described in Section IIIA. The overall family index is adjusted 
for nine comparisons, as in Figure 1. Within each endline round, the component indexes are adjusted for 21 compari-
sons, for 3 arms, and 7 outcomes; p-values less than 0.05 are bolded.
a These variables were not collected during every phase/round, so their regressions have a smaller sample size.
Table 3—Program Impacts on Economic Performance (Continued )
Table 4—Self-Reported Allocation of the Grant, by Expenditure Category
Treatment 
arm
Difference 
(N = 475)
Cash and therapy Cash only Coeff. p-value
Expenditure category (1) (2) (3) (4)
Living expenses (such as food, clothing, rent) 28% 26% 0.03 0.23
Durable assets 7% 6% −0.01 0.48
Drugs, alcohol, gambling, and sex 4% 4% 0.00 1.00
Gifts and transfers to others 11% 11% 0.00 0.97
Business investments and expenses 23% 24% −0.03 0.28
Savings and debt payments 20% 20% 0.01 0.56
Own health and education 8% 8% 0.01 0.68
Notes: Using pictures of different types of spending and plastic chips, grant recipients indicated how they used the 
grant. Columns 1–2 report the means for each treatment arm. Columns 3–4 report the coefficients and p-values from 
an OLS regression of the proportion spent on an indicator for assignment to therapy then cash controlling for block 
fixed effects and baseline covariates.
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over one-half of the grant (significant at the 1 percent level using adjusted p-val-
ues). Meanwhile, the therapy only group resembled the control group in terms of 
investment.
These short-run investments did not last. In the cash only group, the stock of 
business assets after a year was only $19 greater than in the control group, not sta-
tistically significant. We also see no one-year difference in total work hours.43
What happened? From qualitative interviews, insecure property rights were a 
major barrier to capital accumulation. A large number of men reported the theft 
of all their assets, or all their wares, on a regular basis, by criminals or (for market 
wares) the police.44 We added this question to the survey (though not as part of the 
performance index). At each survey round, about 70 percent of the men reported a 
house robbery and belongings stolen in the past month.45 This implies a robbery 
every other month, at least. There is little difference by treatment status, suggesting 
that men were not more likely to be targeted if they received cash. But they would 
have had more to lose.
C. Indications of Noncognitive Skill and Preference Change
Tables 5 and 6 report treatment effects on our six intermediary outcome families 
and their components. For the six family indexes, we report regular standard errors as 
well as p-values adjusted for 18 comparisons (3 arms and 6 families), as in Figure 1 
above. (Correcting for just the three primary outcomes yields qualitatively simi-
lar conclusions.) We also report and discuss the components of each index mainly 
for illustrative purposes. We add p-values adjusted for multiple comparisons within 
each family, so that a family with 4 components is adjusted for 12 comparisons.
Time Preferences.—We report a summary index of four measures of patience and 
four of time inconsistency—akin to  δ and  β in our model. Specifically, we measured: 
a set of incentivized trade-offs between modest amounts of money now versus in 
two weeks, and again in two versus four weeks, that allow us to place men in seven 
ordered bins of patience and time-inconsistency (for an average payout of $3, about 
a day’s wages); a hypothetical (non-incentivized) version of the same trade-offs, 
with higher stakes trade-offs; and self-reported assessments of time preferences. All 
are described in online Appendix D.3.
In the short term, time preferences become more forward-looking for all treat-
ment arms, though the result is largest (0.32 standard deviations) and statistically 
significant only for therapy plus cash (at the 1 percent level even accounting for 
multiple comparisons). After a year, the point estimates from therapy are posi-
tive—0.15 standard deviations for therapy alone and 0.21 standard deviations for 
therapy plus cash. The latter is statistically significant using regular standard errors 
43 All three treatments caused individuals to substitute from illicit work to nonagricultural low-skill business in 
the short term, but the effects were most pronounced and longer lasting for the group that received both cash and 
therapy (see online Appendix E.8). 
44 In some cases this was theft by a friend, family member, or stranger. Also common was confiscation of wares 
by the police. Some forms of market selling contravene official rules, often unenforced, but nonetheless giving 
police opportunities to confiscate. Some confiscation is legitimate, some not. 
45 We do not include this outcome in the economic performance index as it’s not a measure of economic perfor-
mance. Rather we report it in the table mainly for descriptive purposes. 
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but, like all the family indexes, is not significant after a year after accounting for 
multiple comparisons. Looking within the family index, point estimates are larger 
and more precise for patience than time inconsistency.
Self-Control Skills.—We measured self-control skills using standard psycho-
metric questionnaires for four constructs that psychologists associate with less 
impulsive and more planful behavior.46 First, we looked at nine questions from 
the Barrett Impulsiveness Scale (Spinella 2007), which assesses one’s inability to 
46 In addition to these four psychological scales, we also conducted tests of executive function—cognitive pro-
cesses associated with inhibitory control, working memory, self-regulation, and planning, such as digit recall (see 
online Appendix D.6). We did not hypothesize a change in executive function because these are thought to be abil-
ities that solidify in early childhood (online Appendix D.8). As expected, there is no statistically significant change 
from treatment. This is one instance where the NSF proposal says otherwise, but our assessment of the literature 
changed between that proposal and data collection. Hence, we exclude executive function from the index. Including 
it would not materially change our conclusions, since the self-control measure performs weakest of all the noncog-
nitive skills. Online Appendix D.8 reports these robustness checks. 
Table 5—Program Impacts on Time Preferences, Self Control Skills, and Identity/Values
ITT regression: (N = 947)
Therapy only Cash only Both
Control
p-value p-value p-value
mean ITT SE Unadj. Adj. ITT SE Unadj. Adj. ITT SE Unadj. Adj.
Outcome (z-score) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Panel A. 2–5 weeks
Forward-looking time 
 preferences
−0.202 0.179 [0.098] 0.068 0.419 0.071 [0.099] 0.476 0.833 0.318 [0.099] 0.001 0.019
 Patience −0.093 0.187 [0.073] 0.010 0.046 0.116 [0.073] 0.114 0.280 0.267 [0.074] <0.001 0.002
 Time inconsistency 0.008 −0.063 [0.074] 0.393 0.596 −0.009 [0.076] 0.903 0.902 −0.138 [0.075] 0.067 0.209
Self-control skills −0.037 0.085 [0.098] 0.383 0.833 −0.147 [0.104] 0.159 0.595 0.037 [0.096] 0.696 0.833
 Impulsiveness −0.010 −0.011 [0.101] 0.915 0.995 0.180 [0.108] 0.094 0.619 0.104 [0.095] 0.275 0.919
 Conscientiousness −0.077 0.109 [0.105] 0.301 0.919 0.046 [0.106] 0.664 0.995 0.163 [0.105] 0.120 0.684
 Perseverance/GRIT −0.035 0.027 [0.099] 0.785 0.995 −0.130 [0.105] 0.217 0.873 0.042 [0.104] 0.686 0.995
 Reward responsiveness −0.010 −0.071 [0.106] 0.503 0.980 0.107 [0.107] 0.321 0.919 0.013 [0.105] 0.901 0.995
Identity and values −0.169 0.192 [0.095] 0.043 0.319 0.199 [0.092] 0.031 0.259 0.268 [0.097] 0.006 0.067
 Attitudes toward use 
  of violence
0.100 −0.206 [0.094] 0.028 0.123 −0.187 [0.096] 0.051 0.176 −0.180 [0.097] 0.065 0.176
 Index of appearance −0.118 0.085 [0.081] 0.295 0.298 0.131 [0.081] 0.105 0.189 0.203 [0.080] 0.011 0.062
Panel B. 12–13 months
Forward-looking time 
 preferences
−0.149 0.149 [0.102] 0.144 0.826 0.105 [0.102] 0.303 0.952 0.209 [0.105] 0.047 0.464
 Patience −0.240 0.170 [0.103] 0.097 0.350 0.145 [0.096] 0.132 0.386 0.258 [0.099] 0.009 0.048
 Time inconsistency 0.129 −0.072 [0.083] 0.386 0.712 0.018 [0.087] 0.833 0.836 −0.059 [0.084] 0.480 0.712
Self-control skills −0.070 0.159 [0.090] 0.080 0.631 −0.025 [0.095] 0.794 0.992 0.244 [0.095] 0.011 0.154
 Impulsiveness 0.082 −0.178 [0.096] 0.064 0.431 0.006 [0.098] 0.951 0.961 −0.212 [0.099] 0.032 0.265
 Conscientiousness 0.018 −0.065 [0.097] 0.506 0.961 −0.028 [0.100] 0.779 0.961 0.044 [0.097] 0.648 0.961
 Perseverance/GRIT −0.037 0.116 [0.099] 0.241 0.851 0.057 [0.099] 0.565 0.961 0.105 [0.103] 0.311 0.903
 Reward responsiveness 0.072 −0.165 [0.102] 0.106 0.580 0.084 [0.100] 0.397 0.938 −0.242 [0.102] 0.018 0.177
Identity and values −0.021 0.013 [0.089] 0.882 0.992 −0.101 [0.089] 0.255 0.962 0.034 [0.090] 0.704 0.904
 Anticriminal/  antiviolent values 0.070 −0.076 [0.088] 0.386 0.880 0.026 [0.088] 0.768 0.948 −0.177 [0.086] 0.040 0.279
 Index of appearance 0.016 −0.102 [0.078] 0.191 0.750 −0.085 [0.077] 0.269 0.813 −0.109 [0.082] 0.182 0.750
 Prosocial behavior 0.018 0.041 [0.088] 0.636 0.948 −0.075 [0.085] 0.378 0.880 −0.017 [0.090] 0.850 0.948
Notes: The table reports intent to treat estimates of the effect of each treatment arm controlling for baseline covari-
ates and block fixed effects. We focus on predefined composite measures, typically defined by survey module. 
The overall summary indexes are the standardized mean of its composite outcomes, standardized. Heteroskedastic 
robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Adjusted p-values use the Westfall-Young method to correct for 
multiple comparisons, as described in Section IIIA. The overall family index is adjusted for 18 comparisons, as in 
Figure 2. Within each endline round, the component indexes are adjusted for three arms and the number of compo-
nents within the family; p-values less than 0.05 are bolded.
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 control thoughts and actions.47 Second, we used eight questions from the NEO-five 
factor personality inventory to assess conscientiousness (Costa and McCrae 1997). 
Topics included following societal rules and controlled, careful behavior. Third, we 
took seven questions on perseverance from the GRIT scale (Duckworth and Quinn 
2009), which captures the ability to press on in the face of difficulty. Finally, we 
selected eight questions on reward responsiveness—whether they are  motivated 
47 Examples include “I buy things on impulse” or “I say things without thinking.” 
Table 6—Impacts on Mental Health, Substance Abuse, and Quality of Social Networks
ITT regression: (N = 947)
Therapy only Cash only Both
Control
p-value p-value p-value
mean ITT SE Unadj. Adj. ITT SE Unadj. Adj. ITT SE Unadj. Adj.
Outcome, z-score (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Panel A. 2–5 weeks
Positive 
 self-regard/
  mental health
−0.168 0.111 [0.091] 0.222 0.681 0.137 [0.093] 0.139 0.582 0.343 [0.094] <0.001 0.004
 Positive 
  self-regard
−0.179 0.121 [0.089] 0.178 0.419 0.151 [0.095] 0.111 0.338 0.346 [0.094] <0.001 0.001
 Depression  
  and distress
0.095 −0.022 [0.099] 0.827 0.827 −0.063 [0.104] 0.546 0.766 −0.210 [0.101] 0.039 0.155
Substance abuse 
 (0–3 index)
1.378 −0.249 [0.070] <0.001 0.006 −0.060 [0.072] 0.407 0.833 −0.197 [0.071] 0.006 0.067
 Usually drinks 0.671 −0.107 [0.041] 0.009 0.062 −0.023 [0.041] 0.575 0.928 −0.030 [0.040] 0.444 0.928
 Usually uses 
  marijuana
0.495 −0.111 [0.037] 0.003 0.022 −0.017 [0.036] 0.640 0.928 −0.141 [0.036] <0.001 0.001
 Usually takes 
  hard drugs
0.212 −0.030 [0.027] 0.271 0.815 −0.020 [0.030] 0.496 0.928 −0.024 [0.030] 0.438 0.928
Quality of social 
 network
−0.241 0.147 [0.062] 0.018 0.178 0.109 [0.061] 0.076 0.422 0.325 [0.062] <0.001 <0.001
 Peer quality −0.160 0.207 [0.091] 0.023 0.190 0.014 [0.095] 0.881 0.996 0.235 [0.094] 0.013 0.120
 Quality of family 
  relations
−0.192 0.106 [0.099] 0.286 0.874 0.131 [0.105] 0.212 0.812 0.307 [0.099] 0.002 0.024
 Ex-commander
  ties
−0.141 −0.011 [0.038] 0.776 0.996 0.013 [0.038] 0.730 0.996 −0.038 [0.038] 0.321 0.874
 “Big men” ties −0.012 0.015 [0.104] 0.889 0.996 0.039 [0.107] 0.714 0.996 0.172 [0.107] 0.109 0.596
Panel B. 12–13 months
Positive 
 self-regard/
  mental health
−0.050 0.032 [0.091] 0.724 0.992 −0.034 [0.091] 0.707 0.992 0.205 [0.090] 0.024 0.287
 Positive 
  self-regard
−0.054 0.029 [0.093] 0.754 0.987 −0.035 [0.092] 0.709 0.987 0.222 [0.090] 0.014 0.072
 Depression  
  and distress
0.022 −0.031 [0.093] 0.741 0.987 0.021 [0.094] 0.824 0.987 −0.113 [0.096] 0.238 0.676
Substance abuse 
 (0–3 index)
1.091 −0.065 [0.061] 0.282 0.951 0.063 [0.062] 0.305 0.952 −0.057 [0.060] 0.335 0.952
 Usually drinks 0.766 −0.063 [0.042] 0.135 0.631 −0.047 [0.042] 0.267 0.813 −0.045 [0.043] 0.288 0.813
 Usually uses 
  marijuana
0.490 −0.024 [0.035] 0.502 0.924 0.018 [0.035] 0.610 0.935 −0.042 [0.036] 0.238 0.812
 Usually takes 
  hard drugs
0.196 −0.005 [0.031] 0.864 0.973 0.079 [0.033] 0.016 0.123 0.006 [0.031] 0.849 0.973
Quality of social 
 network
0.066 0.063 [0.092] 0.496 0.971 −0.044 [0.092] 0.632 0.992 0.139 [0.095] 0.145 0.826
 Peer quality 0.040 0.011 [0.088] 0.898 0.999 −0.070 [0.089] 0.430 0.982 0.017 [0.090] 0.852 0.999
 Quality of family 
  relations
−0.019 0.124 [0.099] 0.213 0.862 0.070 [0.100] 0.485 0.986 0.129 [0.097] 0.185 0.841
 Ex-commander
  ties
0.176 0.004 [0.076] 0.953 0.999 0.026 [0.078] 0.740 0.998 −0.139 [0.074] 0.060 0.458
 “Big men” ties 0.120 0.001 [0.155] 0.997 0.999 −0.130 [0.152] 0.395 0.979 0.071 [0.160] 0.657 0.998
Note: See Table 5.
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by  immediate, typically emotional rewards—from the Behavioral Inhibition/
Behavioral Activation Scale.48 We adapted the scales and questions to the context 
and Liberian English. Online Appendix D lists all questions.
In the short term, respondents reported little change in self-control skills. In fact, 
self-control was the only one of the six families that did not show a statistically 
significant increase in the short run, using unadjusted p-values. In contrast, after a 
year, both therapy and therapy plus cash are associated with increased self-control 
of 0.16 and 0.24 standard deviations. The latter is statistically significant at the 5 
percent level with regular standard errors but not with the adjustment for multiple 
comparisons. Looking at the components of the self-control index, all point in the 
expected direction, though the magnitudes and precision are greatest with impulsiv-
ity and reward responsiveness.
Time preferences enter into our theoretical model differently than self-control, 
but an obvious question is whether they are distinct. The correlation between the 
self-control and time preference summary indices is 0.33, significant at the 1 per-
cent level. If we combine the time preference and self-control measures into a single 
summary index, therapy alone and therapy plus cash both have statistically signifi-
cant positive impacts of roughly 0.22 standard deviations after 2–5 weeks and 0.26 
after 12–13 months (online Appendix D.8).
We must be cautious because all self-control scales are self-reported, and treated 
men could simply be repeating back their lessons. There is some evidence this is not 
so. We divide the 32 self-control questions into two indexes: questions with high 
(44 percent) and low (56 percent) emphasis in the curriculum.49 Table 7 reports the 
ITT estimates after a year. The effect of cash and therapy is at least as large for low 
emphasis items.
Anticriminal Identity/Values.—Social identity and values are not straightforward 
to measure, and we are not aware of existing models. Based on our qualitative work, 
we developed three main measures, which we assemble into a single family index. 
First, we attempted to measure values directly, using a set of 33 self-reported attitudes 
toward the appropriate use crime and violence in the men’s own lives—indicators 
of the degree to which they had internalized mainstream social norms.50 Second, at 
the one-year endline we measured an index of prosocial behaviors, including group 
memberships, group and community leadership, and contributions to local public 
48 Examples include “I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun” or “When I see an 
opportunity for something I like I get excited right away.” Previous research has linked disruptions in and extremes 
of reward motivation to substance abuse (Robinson and Berridge 2000). 
49 We rated each index component on a scale of 0 (not emphasized) to 4 (very emphasized). We then defined 
low-emphasis components as those rated 0 or 1 and high emphasis components as those rated 2 or above. These 
results are unchanged for using 1.5 or 2 as the emphasis cutoff. 
50 Our approach drew on the way social psychologists distinguish between social norms versus attitudes, but we 
focus on the attitudes alone. Social norms capture what people think others do or should do in a particular situation, 
and surveys sometimes then ask the same respondents what they believe is appropriate behavior (i.e., a norm devi-
ation). Our questions are akin to these attitudinal questions. (We did not measure perceived norms because we did 
not have the space, nor did we deem the measure a priority.) Specifically, we asked 11 questions on attitudes to the 
use of violence to solve community or personal problems, such as mob killings of suspected thieves, or attacking 
their unfaithful wife’s lover. We also asked 12 questions about their attitude toward participating in crime, includ-
ing whether they would feel fine taking unwatched goods or stealing $100 from someone’s pocket. We also asked 
about six hypothetical forms of political violence, including whether they discuss protesting with friends or making 
trouble or conflict with the authorities. 
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goods. (These are more of a behavior than a skill or preferences, but we hypoth-
esized that it would be a reasonable proxy, allowing us to infer preferences from 
behaviors.) Finally, the therapy encouraged men to change their appearance as part 
of the identity change, and we asked survey enumerators to record their subjective 
impressions: quality of dress, shoes, cleanliness, and smell.51
In the short run, the family index improves by roughly 0.2 standard deviations 
in all treatment arms, significant at the 5 percent level with unadjusted p-values but 
not with adjusted p-values. With therapy followed by cash, the identity/values index 
rises 0.27 standard deviations, with  p = 0.067 with our conservative adjustment. 
After a year, these treatment effects attenuate somewhat, particularly the change in 
appearance (which reverses in sign), and so the change is not statistically significant 
at conventional levels. Among the three components, however, the largest change 
appears to be in self-reported anticriminal and antiviolent values, and the impacts 
are sustained after a year in magnitude (though not statistically significant).52
Positive Self-Regard/Mental Health.—Half our mental health family index is 
positive self-regard. Poor self-regard has been linked with many aspects of nega-
tive behavior and counterproductive or extreme risk-seeking behavior (Coopersmith 
1967). Some research (e.g., Judge et al. 2002) suggests self-regard is captured by 
an interrelated set of psychological scales, including: (i) neuroticism, the tendency 
to experience emotional instability or anxiety, assessed with eight questions from 
the NEO-5 factor personality inventory (Costa and McCrae 1997); (ii) self-esteem, 
assessed with eight questions such as, “I am able to do things as well as most other 
people” or “I take a positive attitude toward myself ”; and (iii) locus of control, the 
51 Unlike the other two measures, we did not prespecify appearance as a reflection of identity and values in the 
NSF proposal. But it is difficult to see where else it belongs, and at the suggestion of referees we include it in this 
family. 
52 As with self-control, we divide the 29 value questions into 2 indexes by high and low emphasis in the cur-
riculum. Table 7 reports the ITT estimates after a year. The effect of cash and therapy is at least as low for the low 
emphasis components. 
Table 7—Program Impacts on Noncognitive Skills and Values According to Their Coverage  
in the STYL Curriculum, 12–13 Month Only
ITT regression: (N = 947 subjects)
Control
Therapy only Cash only Both
Outcome (number of question in index), mean ITT SE ITT SE ITT SE
z-score (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Summary index of self-control skills
 Topics emphasized in curriculum (16) −0.092 0.169 [0.090] 0.026 [0.091] 0.170 [0.093]
 Topics not emphasized in curriculum (16) −0.024 0.054 [0.098] −0.070 [0.101] 0.232 [0.099]
Summary index of anticriminal/ 
 antiviolent valuesa
 Topics emphasized in curriculum (8) 0.041 −0.085 [0.107] 0.012 [0.110] −0.116 [0.108]
 Topics not emphasized in curriculum (21) 0.070 −0.062 [0.087] 0.028 [0.087] −0.184 [0.086]
Notes: The table reports intent to treat estimates of the effect of each treatment arm controlling for baseline covari-
ates and block fixed effects. We have subdivided the summary indexes reported in Table 5 by their coverage of the 
specific topics in the STYL curriculum.
a These variables were not collected during every phase/round, so their regressions have a smaller sample size.
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extent to which individuals believe they versus fate control events affecting them, 
measured using eight questions from a standard questionnaire (Sapp and Harrod 
1993). Arguably related to positive self-regard, we also collected a classic happiness 
measure, asking men to rank their subjective well-being in absolute terms and rela-
tive to others in their community.53
A second element of the mental health index is depression and distress. We 
assessed 6 symptoms of depression and 12 symptoms of posttraumatic stress, 
based on a locally adapted instrument used previously with ex-combatant pop-
ulations in Liberia (Blattman and Annan 2016). We group this with positive 
self-regard as a mental health family in the interests of minimizing the number of 
families.
We treat positive self-regard/mental health as distinct from the anticriminal iden-
tity and values because, in principle, a positive self-image and criminal/outcast 
social identity are compatible. This simply happens to be uncommon in Liberia, 
where there is typically little social esteem associated with outcast/criminal social 
category. Moreover, the main purpose of the anticriminal measure was not to cap-
ture the quality of the men’s self image, but rather their change in values, as illus-
trated in the theoretical model.
In the short run, a family index of these measures rises 0.34 standard deviations 
from therapy plus cash (significant at the 1 percent level using multiple compari-
sons). After a year, these treatment effects attenuate and are significant with unad-
justed p-values only. Examining components suggests that the effects are driven 
most of all by the subjective well-being measure and self-esteem, although this does 
not stand up to adjusted p-values.
Substance Abuse.—Therapy tried to equip participants with strategies to cut back 
substance abuse, and while an obvious outcome of interest, it was not one we spec-
ified in advance of primary interest for two reasons: the program’s overwhelming 
focus on antisocial behaviors, with drug use seen by NEPI as only a modest factor; 
and the fact that systematic reviews of CBT do not find support for its effective-
ness treating substance use disorder (Hofmann et al. 2012). Nonetheless, if the ther-
apy decreased substance use, we could see both economic and antisocial behavior 
change.
In the short run, reports of daily use of in the control group are 67 percent for 
alcohol, 50 percent for marijuana, and 21 percent for hard drugs. An index of all 
three indicators (0–3) fell 0.20, significant at the 10 percent level using adjusted 
p-values. At the one-year endline, reports of daily use of in the control group are 
roughly similar. An index of all three indicators (0–3) fell only 0.06 after a year as a 
result of therapy and cash (not statistically significant).
Quality of Social Networks.—Finally, we also assessed risky social networks.54 
We did not prespecify a change here, but over the course of the qualitative  interviews, 
53 We asked about well-being, health, wealth, and power in absolute terms. We asked about wealth, respect, 
power, and access to services in relative terms. Each used a picture of a ladder with ten rungs. The summary index 
is the average of each ladder. Patterns are broadly similar across all ladders. 
54 In some settings, neighborhood changes would also indicate a change in risky behavior, but not in Liberia. 
Most high-crime neighborhoods in Monrovia are mixed-income residential and market areas where high-risk men 
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respondents repeatedly talked about changing peer groups to avoid crime, violence, 
and drugs. We thus measured the traits, positive and negative, of men’s five clos-
est peers.55 We also asked about closeness to and support received from family 
members, former rebel commanders, and “big men” (intended to connote a criminal 
boss). A summary index of positive social networks increased in the short run by 
0.15 standard deviations with therapy and 0.33 standard deviations with therapy 
plus cash (the latter significant at the 1 percent level with adjusted p-values). After 
a year, the point estimates remain positive, but are about one-half as large and not 
statistically significant.
D. Insights from Qualitative Interviews and Observation
One of the strongest impressions we gained from interviews was the importance 
men attached to identity change, or what NEPI called transformation. Nearly all 
of the subjects described feeling ostracized at baseline, and many reported that the 
therapy pushed them to believe they could be someone better for the first time. 
The facilitators played an important role here. The participants we interviewed 
unanimously had admiration and praise for the facilitators, highlighting that their 
backgrounds demanded respect and provided credibility, while their personal sto-
ries of change were encouraging. Beyond modeling the change in social identity, 
men reported the facilitators were also sometimes the first people to treat them with 
seriousness and respect, and this built their confidence to reintroduce themselves to 
community members, or to expose themselves to banks and shops.
Attempts to behave normally, especially the exposure to new social situations, 
seemed to reinforce skill and identity change. Many of the men failed in their plans, 
or experienced stigma in their shop or bank visits. In group sessions, men discussed 
what went wrong and why (such as poor decisions, or choice of dress). Men with 
setbacks learned from and were encouraged by the positive experiences of others. 
And facilitators sometimes observed men’s homework attempts and coached them 
through difficulties.
Men’s appearance also transformed during therapy. The first day men arrived with 
long or messy hair, facial hair, dirty or ripped clothing, wearing t-shirts with shorts 
and sandals. Their demeanor was tough, and their appearance signaled outcast sta-
tus. Haircuts were offered in week two, and many men took advantage, symbolizing 
the change. Others showed up beforehand having gotten a haircut on their own. 
Similarly, before the unit on hygiene, some men began arriving in pants, shoes, and 
collared shirts. Typically a few men in each group resisted these changes. But seeing 
the positive experiences of others, they too began to arrive more clean cut, trying out 
the new identity. The survey results confirm a short-term change in appearance. The 
absence of 12–13-month change is puzzling.
are a small minority. They live on the margins, often in abandoned areas within these neighborhoods (building sites, 
forested groves, garbage dumps, and abandoned buildings). Men who turn their lives around do not need to move 
neighborhoods, but rather stay where they are but move in different, more mainstream social circles, avoiding high-
risk hangouts. Thus, we do not report on neighborhood movements. 
55 We ask men who their five closest peers are, by name, and then ask whether they hold any of 20 qualities 
ranging from positive (they work hard, save, go to school) or negative (they steal, do drugs, get in fights). 
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A year later, therapy participants also described applying skills of self-regulation 
in their lives. To avoid fights, they used new tactics: removing themselves from 
emotionally charged situations, allowing space to process their feelings, and ignor-
ing negative automatic thoughts in the favor of more controlled thinking. Related 
were improved social and communication skills. Interviewees described how such 
skills allowed them to engage with community members or in disputes and express 
themselves without anger or violence.
Not only did the community regard them differently, many said, but troubled 
young men began coming to them for advice and lessons learned from the therapy 
once they saw the sudden and sustained change—another important source of rein-
forcement, and perhaps one reason we do not see a change in peer quality in the data.
VI. Can We Believe Our Self-Reported Data?
Self-reported data raise several worries, the most serious being measurement 
error correlated with treatment. For instance, men who receive an antiviolence inter-
vention might be more likely to tell us they are nonviolent, overestimating the esti-
mated treatment effect of therapy.
This kind of bias is hard to square with the patterns of effects we observed. 
Therapy followed by cash would have to induce systematic errors where therapy or 
cash alone did not. Nonetheless, this is possible—for example if the largest misre-
porting were associated with larger past benefits. Thus, concerned that our survey 
measure,  y s , may be biased, we set out to intensively validate some measures,  y v . 
If  y v is closer to the true behavior,  y ∗ , this allows us to estimate the degree and direc-
tion of bias. We summarize the approach, empirical strategy, and results here, with 
details in online Appendix F and Blattman et al. (2016).
A. Approach to Validation
Of more than 4,000 endline surveys, we randomly selected 7.3 percent and 
retested answers to six survey-based measures with two-week recall periods. We 
chose four potentially sensitive behaviors—marijuana use, thievery, gambling, and 
homelessness. We also chose two everyday expenditures that could be subject to 
recall bias or other error—paying to watch television in a video club, and paying 
to charge a mobile phone. We chose these six because we wanted a diverse set of 
behaviors with similar recall periods. We also wanted very specific behaviors (e.g., 
stealing rather than any crime, or marijuana rather than substance abuse). Finally, 
we wanted outcomes that were a primary focus of the treatment (e.g., stealing) and 
others that were not (gambling or expenditures).
We used intense qualitative work—in-depth participant observation, open-ended 
questioning, and efforts to build relationships and trust—to try to elicit more truthful 
answers. Over several days of trust-building and conversation, plus direct observa-
tion, we tried to elicit a direct admission or discussion of the behavior.
We selected and trained eight of the study’s most talented qualitative research 
staff as validators, all Liberians. In the ten days following the survey, a validator 
visited the respondent over four days, spending several hours each day in conversa-
tion and observation. Validators shadowed respondents as they went about their day, 
1196 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW ApRIl 2017
rather than conduct formal interviews. They raised target topics through indirect 
questions while chatting.
Validators developed techniques to foster trusting relationships and to build rap-
port: becoming close to street leaders; eating meals with subjects; sharing personal 
information (including similar acts they or their friends engaged in); and mirror-
ing participants’ appearance and vernacular as appropriate. Validators would also 
observe the respondent’s behavior from afar, as well as converse with peers and 
family. The goal was to attain insider status, and thus reduce the chance of misre-
porting. The premise was that time, a focus on a small number of behaviors, and 
trust/rapport building would mean that respondents were less willing, or feel less 
able, to deceive a more familiar person, who also knows them better. Validators also 
had the opportunity to clear up misunderstandings and get a more accurate assess-
ment of the behaviors. By discussing sensitive behaviors openly, relating their own 
experiences and that of friends, validators sought to dispel any notion that certain 
answers are more desirable, or would result in any strategic gains.
Without knowing the respondent’s survey response,  y s , the validators coded an 
indicator of whether or not the respondent engaged in the behaviors in the two weeks 
prior to the survey,  y v . The authors reviewed the evidence and the coding for every 
case. In general, we used a relatively high standard of evidence, only coding  y v = 1 
for a direct admission of the behavior or persuasive statements that they did not 
engage in the behavior.56
If this technique simply reproduced the errors in the survey data, then the val-
idation is little help. The key assumption is that four days of building trust and 
gathering extensive information, regarding just six behaviors, reduced experimenter 
demand and other biases correlated with treatment compared to responses during a 
300-question, 90-minute questionnaire.
Nonetheless,  y v is not free from error. Online Appendix F.1 reviews our approach 
and its limitations in more detail. Many of these limitations—the requirement of a 
direct admission, the disruption in people’s lives, errors in recall periods, or increased 
social desirability bias from scrutiny—undoubtedly led to systematic errors in  y v . 
These errors, however, are not necessarily correlated with treatment. This is possi-
ble, for example, because validators could have learned men’s treatment status in 
conversation, and this could have biased their coding. Nonetheless, we designed the 
trust-building and evidentiary standards to minimize this risk.
B. Survey-Validation Differences
Of the 297 men we selected for validation, we found and validated 240 (81 per-
cent).57 Table 8 reports the means of  y s and  y v in the full sample and each treat-
ment arm, as well as the percentage of times the two measures agree;  y s and  y v are 
56 The validators only witnessed or received third-party evidence of the behavior in one-fifth of cases, but nei-
ther was considered sufficient evidence for a final coding. Both had to be followed by questions confirming that the 
respondent also engaged in the behavior in the two weeks prior to the survey. In general, we used a relatively high 
standard of evidence, only coding  y v = 1 if the validator directly observed the behavior or the respondent directly 
admitted it. 
57 Attrition was higher than the survey as we could not validate the behaviors of men who migrated across the 
country. Attrition was not correlated with treatment or baseline covariates (Blattman et al. 2016). 
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identical about 80 percent of the time for sensitive measures and about 70 percent 
of the time for expenditures. As expected, however,  
_
 y s <  _ yv : the average person 
reported 1.21 sensitive behaviors and 1.09 expenditures in validation, and 1.12 sen-
sitive behaviors and 0.82 expenditures in the survey.
With this sample, only the underreporting of expenditures is statistically signif-
icant. We report  t -tests of the simple difference,  y i s −  y i v , in online Appendix F.2.1, 
as well as a discussion of patterns of under- and overreporting. Expenditure under-
reporting appears to be largest in the control group, possibly because they are trying 
to appear more needy. Among sensitive behaviors, underreporting is generally less 
than 10 percent of the survey means, and is only statistically significant in the case 
Table 8—Comparison of Survey and Qualitative Validation Means at Endline
Potentially sensitive behaviors Expenditures
 
All 
(0– 4) Steal Marijuana Gamble Homeless
All 
(0–2) Video Phone
All 
(0–6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A. Full sample
Survey mean 1.12 0.22 0.48 0.18 0.23 0.82 0.42 0.39 1.93
  (  y s ) (1.14) (0.42) (0.50) (0.39) (0.42) (0.73) (0.50) (0.49) (1.31)
Validation mean 1.21 0.20 0.51 0.29 0.21 1.09 0.61 0.48 2.30
  (  y v ) (1.18) (0.40) (0.50) (0.45) (0.41) (0.74) (0.49) (0.50) (1.21)
Percent in agreement 79 85 72 82 62 82
Panel B. Control group
Survey mean 1.25 0.27 0.48 0.23 0.27 0.68 0.37 0.32 1.93
  (  y s ) (1.31) (0.45) (0.50) (0.43) (0.45) (0.70) (0.49) (0.47) (1.44)
Validation mean 1.30 0.23 0.49 0.34 0.23 1.18 0.65 0.54 2.48
  (  y v ) (1.23) (0.42) (0.50) (0.48) (0.42) (0.70) (0.48) (0.50) (1.21)
Percent in agreement 80 88 72 77 47 75
Panel C. Therapy only
Survey mean 1.06 0.19 0.48 0.17 0.22 0.81 0.41 0.41 1.87
  (  y s ) (1.11) (0.39) (0.50) (0.38) (0.42) (0.75) (0.50) (0.50) (1.35)
Validation mean 1.09 0.17 0.48 0.24 0.20 0.98 0.54 0.44 2.07
  (  y v ) (1.14) (0.38) (0.50) (0.43) (0.41) (0.76) (0.50) (0.50) (1.24)
Percent in agreement 80 89 74 80 72 81
Panel D. Cash only
Survey mean 1.03 0.21 0.49 0.13 0.21 0.77 0.37 0.40 1.81
  (  y s ) (1.16) (0.41) (0.50) (0.34) (0.41) (0.71) (0.49) (0.49) (1.35)
Validation mean 1.32 0.23 0.53 0.33 0.24 1.00 0.55 0.45 2.32
  (  y v ) (1.26) (0.42) (0.50) (0.47) (0.43) (0.81) (0.50) (0.50) (1.33)
Percent in agreement 76 82 74 90 56 85
Panel E. Therapy + cash
Survey mean 1.13 0.22 0.48 0.21 0.22 0.98 0.54 0.44 2.11
  (  y s ) (0.98) (0.42) (0.50) (0.41) (0.42) (0.73) (0.50) (0.50) (1.11)
Validation mean 1.11 0.19 0.52 0.24 0.16 1.17 0.70 0.48 2.29
  (  y v ) (1.11) (0.40) (0.50) (0.43) (0.37) (0.68) (0.46) (0.50) (1.05)
Percent in agreement 81 83 68 81 71 87
Observations 239 238 238 238 239 239 238 239 239
Notes: The table reports the means (standard deviations) of the survey and the qualitatively validated measures for 
the full sample and by treatment arm. Percent in agreement is the percentage of respondents for whom the survey 
indicator equals the qualitatively validated indicator.
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of gambling. This is mainly driven by the cash only arm, who may have been reluc-
tant to report spending the grant this way.
C. Is Measurement Error Correlated with Treatment?
Empirical Strategy.—If we believe that the validation measure is closer to the 
true behavior, then one way to test for bias in the survey-based treatment effects 
is to take the difference  y i s −  y i v , our proxy of measurement error for person  i , and 
regress it on treatment:
(2)  y i s −  y i v =  β 0 +  β 1  T i +  μ i . 
If  β 1 < 0 for sensitive measures, then treated men were more likely to underreport 
bad behaviors, and our survey-based treatment effects may overestimate the decline 
in antisocial behaviors. And if  β 1 > 0 for expenditures, then treated men may have 
overreported their expenditures more than the control group, and our survey-based 
treatment effects may overestimate the short-run increase in income.
With a sample of 240, we estimate we are powered to detect average under- or 
overreporting of at least 14 percent, and error correlated with treatment of 28 per-
cent.58 Because of power concerns, we pay close attention to the sign, magnitude, 
and confidence interval for  β 1 .
Of course, the crucial assumption is that  y v is closer to the true behavior. This 
parallels the no liars and no design effects assumptions in list experiments. The 
assumption cannot be tested directly, but can only be argued on context and the 
quality of the approach.
We can also let misreporting vary by whether validation confirmed the behavior:
(3)  y i s =  β ̃0 +  β ̃1  T i +  β ̃2  y i v +  β ̃3 ( y i v ×  T i) +  μ ̃ i . 
Equation (2) is simply the special case where  β ̃2 = 1 and  β ̃3 = 0 .59 We are mainly 
interested in whether  β ̃1 ≠ 0 and  β ̃1 +  β ̃3 ≠ 0 . The disadvantage of this more 
flexible form is statistical power, especially with three treatment arms.60 We are also 
interested in correcting for the average bias in survey-based treatment effects, which 
we get from  β 1 from equation (2). But the more flexible form provides insight into 
58 Our target sample of 297 was the maximum number of interviews we felt qualified validators could manage 
logistically. We calculated minimum detectable effects (MDE) using a two-sided hypothesis test with 80 percent 
power at a 0.05 significance level, using baseline and block controls when calculating the R2 statistic. We calculated 
an MDE for both the 0–2 expenditures index and the 0–4 sensitive behaviors index. The expenditures index had a 
mean of 0.82 in the survey and an MDE of 0.13 for general over- and underreporting, and 0.29 for a treatment effect 
on misreporting. The sensitive behaviors index had a mean of 1.12 in the survey and an MDE of 0.2 for general 
over- and underreporting, and 0.36 for any treatment effect on misreporting. We estimate that doubling the sample 
size would have increased power by about one-third. 
59 Online Appendix F.1 derives and interprets these regressions in more detail. 
60 With 240 observations in total, each parameter is estimated off of roughly 30 observations, putting us on a 
steep part of the power curve. 
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the patterns of measurement error. For instance, if underreporting is concentrated 
among men who commit crimes and were treated, then  β ̃1 +  β ̃3 < 0 .61
Results for Sensitive Behaviors.—We estimate equations (2) and (3) in Table 9, 
including block fixed effects.62 For sensitive behaviors, almost none of the coef-
ficients on treatment indicators or interactions are statistically significant. We see 
little evidence of the therapy inducing a desirability bias, and indeed the effects run 
in the opposite direction.
Indeed, looking at the index of four sensitive measures (panel A, column 5),  β 1 is 
actually greater than zero for therapy plus cash, implying that the impacts of therapy 
plus cash are, if anything, larger than the survey data imply. Online Appendix F.3 
displays these updated treatment effects. For example, using survey data alone, 
the treatment effect (standard error) of therapy and cash on the sensitive behaviors 
index is −0.4 (0.09), a 36 percent decrease. The results from panel A, column 5 
suggest that the adjusted treatment effect should be −0.516 (0.194), significant at 
the 1 percent level.
The results of the more flexible regression in panel B, column 5 show that 
these averages conceal important heterogeneity. Treated men who we think 
did not engage in the sensitive behaviors tend to overreport them  ( β ̃1 Both > 0) , 
and treated men engaged in the sensitive behaviors seem to underreport them 
( β ̃1 Both +  β ̃3 Both < 0) .
Results for Expenditures.—All treatment arms associated with a roughly 
0.3  increase in our proxy for measurement error (panel A, column 8). There is 
underreporting across all arms, but it is greatest in the control group. This could 
have implications for one of our main findings, on income. Using survey data, the 
treatment effect of cash only on the 2-item expenditure index is 0.08 (0.052), which 
is consistent with the short-run increase in consumption we observed among cash 
recipients. But adjusting for observed measurement error, the adjusted treatment 
effect is −0.205 (0.143).
Interpretation.—Our qualitative work suggests two explanations. The men have 
been members of a subculture where drugs, crime, and gambling are commonplace, 
and admitting to the behaviors in a survey carries little stigma. Speculatively, therapy 
may have accustomed men to talking about these behaviors or reduced stigma. As 
for expenditures, control men may have acted strategically, trying to appear poorer 
in the hopes they would be eligible for assistance. We discuss implications for our 
conclusions in the following section.
61 If we exclude the block fixed effects used for estimating ITT effect, as in equation (1), then  β ̃0 also contains 
information: if men honestly report crime in the survey then  β ̃0 should be close to 0 and  β ̃2 should be close to 1, 
while if there is a general desirability bias in the survey, then  β ̃0 +  β ̃2 < 1 . See online Appendix F.2.2 for this 
analysis. In general, estimates of  β ̃0 suggest that sensitive behaviors are 12–15 percent more likely to be reported 
in the survey, possibly because of the validator’s fidelity to the two-week recall period and specific definitions, or a 
general conservatism, but there is no evidence this survey overreporting is correlated with treatment, which is the 
main purpose of the analysis. 
62 That is, in equations (2) and (3) we actually estimate  β 0j and  β ̃0j , which is necessary to identify treatment 
effects when the probability of treatment assignment varies by block. The results without block fixed effects (not 
shown) are qualitatively similar. 
1200 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW ApRIl 2017
VII. Discussion
A. Lessons from the Cash Transfer
One lesson is that these supposedly undisciplined men largely invested and saved 
a grant. Even accounting for the underreporting we see in gambling and other expen-
ditures, little of the grants seem to have been spent on temptation goods. While 
Table 9—Estimates of the Correlation between Treatment and Measurement Error
Dependent variable: (N = 239)
 y s −  y v , sensitive behaviors  y s −  y v , expenditures
Stealing Marijuana Gambling Homeless
All 
(0– 4)
Video 
club
Phone 
charging
All 
(0–2)
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Constrained, with block fixed effects (equation (2))
 β 0 (constant) −0.029 0.062 −0.109 0.093 0.015 −0.326 −0.194 −0.517[0.087] [0.061] [0.093] [0.076] [0.177] [0.118] [0.095] [0.158]
 β 1 
 Therapy −0.019 0.015 0.025 −0.025 −0.004 0.170 0.174 0.339
[0.084] [0.057] [0.097] [0.091] [0.199] [0.102] [0.085] [0.132]
 Cash −0.038 −0.042 −0.085 −0.077 −0.237 0.109 0.165 0.269
[0.088] [0.067] [0.090] [0.079] [0.195] [0.111] [0.078] [0.134]
 Both −0.006 −0.024 0.077 0.031 0.079 0.127 0.181 0.304
[0.080] [0.062] [0.095] [0.089] [0.183] [0.103] [0.075] [0.115]
Dependent variable: (N = 239)
 y s , sensitive behaviors  y s , expenditures
Stealing Marijuana Gambling Homeless
All 
(0– 4)
Video 
club
Phone 
charging
All 
(0–2)
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B. Unconstrained, with block fixed effects (equation (3))
 β ̃0 (constant) 0.301 0.098 0.231 0.283 0.976 0.367 0.047 0.048[0.140] [0.092] [0.118] [0.129] [0.287] [0.130] [0.093] [0.208]
 β ̃1 
 Therapy −0.022 0.010 −0.009 −0.036 0.154 −0.190 0.100 −0.011
[0.070] [0.077] [0.074] [0.079] [0.228] [0.124] [0.072] [0.207]
 Cash 0.003 0.025 −0.079 −0.138 −0.069 −0.072 0.040 0.089
[0.068] [0.081] [0.064] [0.070] [0.220] [0.139] [0.068] [0.219]
 Both −0.013 0.025 0.064 −0.025 0.271 −0.113 0.041 −0.150
[0.064] [0.081] [0.076] [0.083] [0.241] [0.138] [0.064] [0.209]
 β ̃2 (  y v ) 0.496 0.735 0.315 0.405 0.677 0.038 0.504 0.328[0.158] [0.096] [0.108] [0.158] [0.108] [0.123] [0.096] [0.129]
 β ̃3 
 Therapy  ×  y v −0.166 −0.014 −0.131 −0.020 −0.210 0.434 0.079 0.222
[0.234] [0.125] [0.176] [0.220] [0.147] [0.169] [0.143] [0.169]
 Cash  ×  y v −0.232 −0.114 −0.063 0.286 −0.134 0.133 0.196 0.064
[0.208] [0.134] [0.148] [0.202] [0.144] [0.174] [0.137] [0.169]
 Both  ×  y v −0.064 −0.085 −0.241 0.066 −0.230 0.386 0.234 0.379
[0.214] [0.129] [0.173] [0.232] [0.137] [0.171] [0.130] [0.168]
p-value from test that  β ̃1 =  β ̃3 = 0 
 Therapy 0.671 0.991 0.682 0.867 0.345 0.035 0.161 0.098
 Cash 0.511 0.648 0.299 0.115 0.307 0.744 0.134 0.380
 Both 0.908 0.784 0.369 0.941 0.240 0.023 0.054 0.005
Notes: The table reports the degree and direction of bias in our treatment effects. In panel A, we assume that our 
measurement error does not vary by whether or not the individual engages in the behavior, which allows for a sim-
ple way to use  β 2 to adjust our ITT estimates. In panel B, we relax this assumption and let the measurement error 
vary by behavior and treatment arm at the cost of reduced statistical power.
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Evans and Popova (2017) see the same result in 19 other cash transfer programs, it’s 
striking to see the same with this extreme group. Caution is also warranted, because 
of the evidence that the control group underreported expenditures. But in the short 
run, men seem to have used the cash for petty trade, earning returns to capital of at 
least 26 percent.63
There is only weak evidence, however, that criminal activities fell as business 
income rose. Those who received cash reduced their antisocial behaviors only 0.08 
standard deviations (not significant) but reduced stealing by about 30 percent (sig-
nificant at the 10 percent level with unadjusted p-values only). The direction of 
effects, however, is consistent with rural ex-combatants in Liberia, who shifted away 
from illicit activities when a much more intensive employment program raised their 
farm productivity (Blattman and Annan 2016).
Any investments and income gains disappeared within a year, however, in part 
due to poor property rights protections. The men’s homes and neighborhoods were 
highly insecure. Extrapolating from reports of burglary and theft at each endline 
(from Table 3), men in our sample experienced a theft or robbery roughly eight 
times in the year after the grant. While treated men were no more likely to experi-
ence theft, they had more to lose, especially their savings and investment in nascent 
businesses.
Nonetheless, the fact that cash was well used is important, since concerns about 
temptation spending restrain political support for cash-based welfare programs. The 
men received a few months’ worth of income, and basic consumption—especially 
basic shelter and food—improved for about that length of time. This is important.
Future research should study how to sustain the economic effects of cash. It may 
be that helping people relocate to better quality neighborhoods or enhance their per-
sonal security, or providing the information and means to gain necessary licenses or 
protection from security forces, would reduce expropriation. Alternately, programs 
can try to provide crude insurance. It is possible that regular cash transfers would 
stimulate enterprise development more than the one-time transfer we study (Bianchi 
and Bobba 2013; Karlan, Knight, and Udry 2015).
B. Lessons from Behavior Change
The interventions have extremely similar impacts on both antisocial behaviors 
and an index of all noncognitive skill and preference measures, suggesting that non-
cognitive change, broadly speaking, was a major source of behavior change. The 
impact of cash plus therapy on antisocial behaviors (0.31 standard deviations in two 
to five weeks and 0.25 after a year) is mirrored by a change of similar magnitude in 
noncognitive skills and preferences (0.43 standard deviations in two to five weeks 
and 0.25 after a year: see Figure 1). Likewise, therapy alone significantly affects 
antisocial behaviors and noncognitive changes within two to five weeks but not after 
63 For instance, the impact on earnings ($8.25 a month) represents a monthly return of 4.1 percent on the $200 
grant, while the impact on nondurable consumption ($48 per month) represents a monthly return of 24 percent. 
While there are reasons these figures might overstate returns, recall that men only invested about 60 percent in the 
month after the grant, implying returns on actual investment are probably higher. Unfortunately we cannot say 
whether the cash grant passed a cost-benefit test in private monetary returns alone. 
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a year, and cash alone does not have a significant effect on either outcome in any 
period.
Among the six noncognitive families we defined, all but self-control skills showed 
a large and (with unadjusted standard errors) statistically significant decline after two 
to five weeks as a result of therapy and cash. Forward-looking time preferences, men-
tal health (particularly positive self-regard), social networks (particularly peer quality 
and family relationships), and identity/values all show large and robust changes after 
adjusting for multiple comparisons. After a year, it is difficult to single out any one 
noncognitive skill or preference change as robust. Individually, the largest and most 
precise changes are in forward-looking time preferences and self-control skills.
Nonetheless, if we were to merge time preferences and self-control skills into a 
single index of future orientation, we see some evidence of sustained impacts as a 
result of therapy plus cash. The combined index increased by 0.22 standard devia-
tions after two to five weeks (adjusted  p = 0.029 ), and by 0.26 standard deviations 
after one year (adjusted  p = 0.068 ). We must take this result with some caution, 
partly because we prespecified them as distinct measures, and partly because we do 
not see robust changes in short-term self-control. Nonetheless, a change in future 
orientation would echo the effects of adolescent CBT programs in Chicago that tar-
get similar automatic behaviors (Heller et al. 2015).
We see less conclusive evidence on the least standard aspect of the therapy—the 
focus on changing social identity and values. This family index increased 0.27 stan-
dard deviations after two to five weeks, significant at the 1 percent level with con-
ventional standard errors but an adjusted  p = 0.067 . This index change driven by 
significant changes in both appearance and anticriminal values. But effects mod-
erate after a year, particularly for appearance (and with the addition of prosocial 
behaviors), and become less precise.
These estimates contrast with men’s qualitative personal accounts, where iden-
tity change was paramount. Qualitatively, the changes in appearance, in community 
regard, and the exposure to new places and situations seem to have been particularly 
important. So was the identity of the NEPI facilitators, and the fact that they mod-
eled this identity change. This change has a basis in the theory underlying CBT: 
positive interactions challenged respondents’ negative beliefs about themselves, 
and reinforced their identity as more responsible, mainstream members of society. 
Possibly identity and values are difficult to measure, and so this remains an import-
ant area for further innovation and testing.
In psychology, efficacy trials such as this one are typically followed by further 
trials that try to identify the “active ingredients,” by varying modules and methods. 
This, plus more investment in measurement, seems like a fruitful area for research.
C. Understanding the Cash–Therapy Interaction
We did not expect that the effects of therapy would persist only when cash was 
received as well. Our theory predicted that the two interventions should have a larger 
effect only if cash raises earnings permanently, which was not the case.
Our qualitative evidence and psychological theory, however, suggest a hypothesis 
for testing in future trials: that receiving cash was akin to an extension of therapy, 
in that it provided more time for the men to practice independently and to  reinforce 
1203BLATTMAN ET AL.: REDUCING CRIME AND VIOLENCEVOL. 107 NO. 4
their changed skills, identity, and behaviors. The therapy was brief—just eight 
weeks long. It helped men change their intentions, identity, and behavior, and pro-
vided almost daily commitment and reinforcement. After eight weeks the men who 
received therapy alone had to contend with their usual economic and peer pressures. 
The grant, however, provided some men with the cash they needed to maintain their 
new identity—to avoid homelessness, to feed themselves, and to continue to dress 
well. They had no immediate financial need to return to crime.
The men could also do something consistent with their new identity and skills: 
execute plans for a business. This was a source of practice and reinforcement of 
their newfound skills and identity. It was also a form of performance, to themselves 
as well as their family and neighbors, who could see the men engage in legitimate 
business. Our qualitative interviews also suggested that the cash helped men to sur-
vive shocks. In this way, the grant may have parallels to booster sessions commonly 
used in therapy. A small body of experimental research on CBT for aggression or 
substance abuse indicates that follow-up therapy sessions weeks or months after the 
intervention improve 12–13-month outcomes (e.g., Lochman 1992).
Caution is warranted. We cannot reject the hypothesis, for instance, that posi-
tive reinforcement from winning a grant was enough to reinforce therapy. In future 
research, a comparison of extended therapy to shorter therapy plus cash would offer 
a more direct test.
Nonetheless, high short-run returns to capital and sustained social spillovers 
suggest that the combination of cash and therapy had promising returns. Since the 
private returns to the grant were temporary, however, the cost effectiveness rides 
mostly on the social benefits from roughly one fewer crime per week per person. 
These social returns are unknown. If these social returns are greater than $20 or $25 
per crime, however, the STYL program is a promising investment on basis of crime 
reduction alone.
D. Generalizability
For several reasons this approach has promise beyond Liberia. First, the therapy 
was adapted from US-based CBT programs, suggesting that adaptability to other 
contexts is feasible. Second, we kept the intervention low-cost and created a  publicly 
available manual, curriculum, and training guidelines to ease adaptation and repli-
cation.64 Third, with time it should be possible to develop qualified and effective 
facilitators in other countries, not least because there are established methods for 
training counselors in CBT; general levels of education (and the number of social 
workers) are greater in most other countries; and new facilitators should emerge 
among graduates of the program, as with STYL.
The theory and results are also strikingly consistent with comparable US pro-
grams and best practice. The attention to noncognitive skill change and social iden-
tity, the targeting of the highest-risk men, as well as the nonresidential nature of the 
therapy, correspond closely to best practice in criminal rehabilitation in US cor-
rectional institutions (Andrews et al. 1990; Lipsey 2009). The 40–50 percent falls 
64 This manual can be found at http://chrisblattman.com/documents/policy/2015.STYL.Program.Manual.pdf.
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in antisocial behaviors we observe are similar in proportion to the falls in arrests 
documented in Tennessee and Chicago (Little, Robinson, and Burnette 1994; Heller 
et al. 2015). Moreover, as in Chicago, the effects of therapy alone were temporary.
Other US work suggests that employment can be complementary to social and 
emotional counseling (Heller 2014). In low-income countries, however, where most 
employment programs will involve self-employment, property security and risk are 
important scope considerations. Cash transfers in other poor countries have gen-
erally led to higher and more persistent incomes, in part because the gains are not 
stolen. So the STYL program could arguably work even better in places with more 
secure property rights.
There are limits to generalizability of course. For instance, there were no gangs 
or armed groups vying for men in our sample. CBT-based approaches may be most 
effective against disorganized, impulsive crime and violence rather than organized 
crime. There is also selection onto the street, and a country which has experienced 
many negative shocks (such as Liberia) might have more high-potential young men 
who need only a little help to regress to the mean. On the other hand, our evidence 
from dropouts suggests that the most antisocial men stay, and the program is most 
effective with them. These limits are speculative without further testing, however, 
and replication and experimentation seem more than warranted given the results of 
these efficacy trials in Liberia, Chicago, and elsewhere.
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